The Specie Standard as a Contingent Rule: Some Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880-1990 by Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ThE SPECIE STANDARD AS A
CONTINGENT RULE:




Working Paper No. 4860




This paper is part of NBER's researchprograms in the Development of the American Economy
and Monetary Economics. Any opinionsexpressed are those of the authors and not those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 1994 by Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz.All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted withoutexplicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper #4860
September1994
THE SPECIE STANDARD AS A
CONTINGENT RULE:
SOME EVIDENCE FOR CORE AND
PERIPHERAL COUNTRIES, 1880-1990
ABSTRACT
The specie standardthat prevailedbefore 1914 wasa contingentrule.Undertherule
specieconvertibility could be suspended in the event of a well understood, exogenously produced
emergency, such as a war,onthe understanding that aftertheemergency had safely passed
convertibility would be restored at the original parity. Market agents would regard successful
adherence as evidence of a credible commitment and would allow the authoritiesaccess to
seigniorage and bond finance at favorable terms.
This paper surveys the history of the specie standard as a contingent rule for 21 countries
divided into core and peripheral countries. As a comparison we alsobriefly consider the Bretton
Woods system and the recent managed floating regime.
We offer some evidence on capital flows 1865 to 1914 from England to two countries of
recent settlement --Argentinaand the United States --duringepisodes of both suspension and
adherence to convertibility. It suggests that adherence to the rulemay have had some influence
on the decision by England to invest abroad.
We then present evidence across four regimes (pre-1914 gold standard; interwargold
standard; Bretton Woods; the subsequent managed exchange rate float) for the 21 countrieson
the stability of macro variables as well as on demand shocks (reflectingpolicy actions specific
to the regime) and supply shocks (reflecting shocks to the environment independent of the
regime). These measures allow us to determine whether adherents to the rule consistently
pursued different policy actions from nonadherents, and whether persistent adverse shocks to the
environment may, for some countries, have precluded adherence to the rule.
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1. Introduction
The classical gold standard era from 1880 to 1914, when most countries of the world defined
their currencies in terms of a fixed weight (which is equivalent to a fixed price) of gold and hence
adhered to a fixed exchange rate standard, has been regarded by many observers as a most admirable
monetary regime. They find that its benefits include long-run price level stability and predictability, stable
and low long-run interest rates, stable exchange rates (McKinnon, 1988), and hence that it facilitated a
massive flow of capital from the advanced countries of Europe to the world's developing countries.
Others have taken a less favorable view of the gold standard's performance. Some criticize the
record of relatively high real output and short-term price variability (Bordo, 1981; Cooper, 1982;
Meltzer and Robinson, 1989), and some have faulted it for subordinating domestic stability to the
maintenance of external convertibility (Keynes, 1930).
A persistent critique of the gold standard is that it provided a favorable experience for the core
countries (England, France, Germany, and the United States), but a less favorable experience for the
peripheral countries of the developing world (Dc Cecco, 1974). For the core countries the balance of
payments adjustment mechanism was stable, so few crises occurred; the peripheral countries, by contrast,
were subject to shocks imported under fixed exchange rates from abroad and frequently suffered exchange
rate crises and a destabilized growth pattern.
An alternative approach to these issues of gold standard history posits that adherence to the fixed
price of specie, which characterized all convertible metallic regimes including the gold standard, served
as a credible conmiitment mechanism to monetary and fiscal policies that otherwise would be time
inconsistent (Bordo and Kydland, 1992; Giovannini, 1993). On this basis, adherence to the specie
standard rule enabled many countries to avoid the problems of high inflation and stagflation that troubled
the late twentieth century. The specie standard that prevailed before 1914 was a contingent rule, or a rule
with escape clauses. Under the rule specie convertibility could be suspended in the event of a well
understood, exogenously produced emergency, such as a war, on the understanding that after the
emergency had safely passed convertibility would be restored at the original parity. Market agents wouldregard successful adherence as evidence of a credible commitment and would allow the authoritiesaccess
to seigniorage and bond finance at favorable terms.
On this view, the core countries were good players of the classical gold standardgame —they
adhered strictly to the rule, whereas many peripheral countries were not. Some never adhered to the rule.
Others joined it when conditions were favorable to them ostensibly to obtain access to capital from the
core countries, but they quickly abandoned it when economic conditions deteriorated.
The interwar gold standard can be regarded as an extension of the pre-1914 system because itwas
based on gold convertibility. However, it was less successful because the commitment toconvertibility
was often subordinated to other politically induced objectives. The Bretton Woods international monetary
system can be regarded as a distant relative of the classical gold standard in that the center country, the
United States, maintained gold convertibility. It was also based on a rule with anescape clause —parities
could be changed in the event of a fundamental disequilibrium. However, it differed from the basic specie
standard rule in that a credible commitment to the fixed parity was not of such primary importance.
This paper surveys the history of the specie standard as a contingent rule from the early
nineteenth century when most countries were still on a bimetallic or silver standard until the gold
standard's final ollapse in the late 1930s. As a comparison we also briefly consider the Bretton Woods
system and the recent managed floating regime. We then present some evidence on the economic
performance of the core and a number of peripheral countries under the various regimes.
Section 2 defines the contingent specie standard rule and discusses how the commitment to
convertibility was maintained. Section 3 presents and discusses a chronology of adherence to the rule
by 21 countries under variants of the specie standard prevailing before World War II. A similar
chronology is included for the Bretton Woods system. Section 4 offers some graphical evidence on capital
flows 1865 to 1914 from England to two countries of recent settlement —Argentinaand the United States
--duringepisodes of both suspension and adherence to convertibility. It suggests that adherence to the
rule may have had some influence on the decision by England to invest abroad.
Section 5 presents evidence on economic performance for 21 countries (both core and peripheral)
across several regimes. Such evidence may shed light on whether differing economic performance can
2explain why some countries successfully adhered to the rule and others did not, or whether
adherence/nonadherence may have influenced performance. We examine the stability of both nominal and
real macro variables across four regimes (pre-1914 gold standard; interwar gold standard; Bretton Woods;
the subsequent managed exchange rate float). We then present measures of both demand shocks
(reflecting policy actions specific to the regime) and supply shocks (reflecting shocks to the environment
independent of the regime). These measures allow us to determine whether adherents to the rule
consistently pursued different policy actions from nonadherents, and whether persistent adverse shocks
to the environment may, for some countries, have precluded adherence to the rule. The paper concludes
with answers to the questions: how successful was the specie standard rule as a contingent rule; why it
was successful when it was; and why some countries adhered while others did not.
2. The Specie Standard as a Contingent Rule
2. 1 The Domestic Gold Standard
A specie standard has been traditionally viewed as a form of monetary rule or constraint over
monetary policy actions. Following a rule, such as adherence to the specie standard, which would cause
the money supply to vary automatically with the balance of payments, was viewed as superior to
entrusting policy to the discretion of well-meaning and possibly well-informed monetary authorities
(Simons, 1951).' In contrast to the traditional view, which stresses both impersonality and automaticity,
the recent literature on the time inconsistency of optimal government policy regards a rule as a credible
commitment mechanism binding policy actions over time.
The absence of a credible commitment mechanism leads governments, in pursuing stabilization
policies, to produce an inflationary outcome (Kydland and Prescott, (1977); Barro and Gordon, (1983).
In a closed economy environment, once the monetary authority has announced a given rate of monetary
growth, which the public expects it to validate, the authority then has an incentive to create a monetary
surprise to either reduce unemployment or capture seigniorage revenue. The public, with rational
expectations, will come to anticipate the authorities' perfidy, leading to an inflationary equilibrium. A
credible precommitment mechanism, by preventing the government from cheating, can preserve long-mn
price stability.
3Following a rule also allows a government to use debt to smooth distortionary taxes
over time. In addition to choosing optimal taxes the government can also choose an optimal default rate
on its outstanding debt. In a commitment regime the government can force itself to honor its outstanding
debt and not default via inflation or suspension of payments. If the government cannot follow a binding
commitment --inother words, if it follows a discretionary regime --rationalbond holders would expect
the government to have an incentive to default on its outstanding debt. Hence, in a discretionary
equilibrium bond holders will be averse to purchasing government debt.
Under the specie standard, the pledge to fix the price of a country's currency in terms of gold,
silver, or both, represents the basic rule. This involved e.g. in the case of a monometallic gold standard,
defining a gold coin as a fixed weight of gold, called for example, one dollar. The monetary authority
was then committed to keep the mint price of gold fixed through the purchase and sale of gold in
unlimited amounts. Under the bimetallic system which prevailed in most countries until the third quarter
of the nineteenth century, he monetary authorities would define the weight of both gold and silver coins,
freely buying and selling them. Maintaining the bimetallic ratio fixed is a variant of the basic
convertibility rule, since it is the fixed value of the unit of account that is the essence of the rule.2
The specie standard rule followed in the century before World War I can be viewed as a form
of contingent rule or rule with escape clauses (Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; DeKock and Grilli,
1989; Flood and Isard, 1989; Bordo and Kydland, 1992). The monetary authority maintains the standard
-keepsthe price of the currency in terms of specie fixed —exceptin the event of a well understood
emergency such as a major war. In wartime it may suspend gold convertibility and issue paper money
to finance its expenditures, and it can sell debt issues in terms of the nominal value of its currency, on
the understanding that debt will eventually be paid off in specie. The rule is contingent in the sense that
the public understands that the suspension will only last for the duration of the wartime emergency plus
some period of adjustment. It assumes that afterwards the government will follow the deflationary
policies necessary to resume payments at the original parity.3 Following such a rule will allow the
government to smooth its revenue from different sources of finance: taxation, borrowing, and seigniorage
(Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Mankiw, 1987).
4As we document in Section 3, the gold standard contingent rule worked successfully for three
core countries of the classical gold standard: Britain, France, and the U.S. In all these countries the
monetary authorities adhered faithfully to the fixed price of gold except during major wars. During the
Napoleonic War and World War I for England, the Civil War for the U.S., and the Franco-Prussian War
for France, specie payments were suspended, paper money and debt were issued. But in each case, after
the wartime emergency had passed, policies leading to resumption were adopted.3 Indeed, successful
adherence to the rule may have enabled the belligerents to obtain access to debt finance more easily in
subsequent wars.6
Examples of discretion --breachesof the rule —includepostponement of resumption after the
war and reasonable delay period, have passed, and pegging to specie at a devalued parity. Under both
situations, should there be another war within memory of the previous one, then the public's behavior
in being willing to absorb government debt would be quite different from that in the previous war, even
if the situation is otherwise similar and the government claims to subscribe to a reasonable delay rule.
It is crucial that the rule be transparent and simple and that only a limited number of
contingencies be included. Transparency and simplicity would avoid the problems of moral hazard and
incomplete information (Canzoneri, 1985; Obstfeld, 1992), i.e. prevent the monetaiy authorities' from
engaging in discretionary policy under the guise of following the contingent rule. In this respect a second
contingency --atemporary suspension in the face of a fmancial crisis, which in turn was not the result
of the monetary authorities' own actions, may also have been part of the rule. However, because of the
greater difficulty of verifying the source of the contingency than in the case of war —invokingthe escape
clause under conditions of financial crisis, or in the case of a shock to the terms of trade (a third possible
contingency) would be more likely to create suspicion that discretion was being followed.
The specie standard rule may have been enforced by reputational considerations. Long-run
adherence to the rule was based on the historical evolution itself of the standard, thus e.g. gold was
accepted as money because of its intrinsic value and desirable properties. Paper claims, developed to
economize on the scarce resources tied up in a commodity money, became acceptable only because they
were convertible into gold.
5In turn, the reputation of the specie standard would constrain the monetary authorities from
breaching convertibility, except under well-understood contingencies. Thus, when an emergency
occurred, the abandonment of the standard would be viewed by all to be a temporary event since, from
their experience, only specie or specie-backed claims truly served as money. An alternative commitment
mechanism was to guarantee gold convertibility in the constitution. This was the case for example in
Sweden before 1914, when laws pertaining to the gold standard could be changed only by two identical
parliamentary decisions with an election in between (Jonung, 1984, p. 368). Convertibility was also
enshrined in the laws of a number of gold standard central banks (Giovannini, 1993).
2.2 The International Gold Standard
The specie standard rule originally evolved as a domestic commitment mechanism but its enduring
fame is as an international rule. The classical gold standard emerged as a true international standard by
1880 following the switch by the majority of countries from bimetallism, silver monometalism, and paper
to gold as the basis of their currencies, (Eichengreen 1985). As an international standard, the key rule
was maintenance of gold convertibility at the established par. Maintenance of a fixed price of gold by
its adherents in turn ensured fixed exchange rates. The fixed price of domestic currency in terms of gold
provided a nominal anchor to the international monetary system.
Recent evidence suggests that, indeed, exchange rates throughout the 1880 to 1914 period were
characterized by a high degree of fi.xity in the principal countries. Although exchange rates frequently
deviated from par, violations of the gold points were rare (Officer, 1986), as were devaluations
(Eichengreen, 1985).
According to the game theoretic literature, for an international monetary arrangement to be
effective both between countries and within them, a time consistent credible commitment mechanism is
required (Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991). Adherence to the gold convertibility rule provided such a
mechanism. Indeed, Giovannini (1993) finds the variation of both exchange rates and short-term interest
rates within the limits set by the gold points in the 1899-1909 period consistent with market agents'
expectations of a credible commitment by the "core" countries to the gold-standard rule in the sense of
this paper.7 In addition to the reputation of the domestic gold standard and constitutional provisions
6which ensured domestic commitment, adherence to the international gold-standard rule may have been
enforced by other mechanisms. These include: improved access to international capital markets; the
operation of the rules of the game; the hegemonic power of England; and central bank cooperation.
Support for the international gold standard likely grew because it provided improved access to
the international capital markets of the core countries. Countries were eager to adhere to the standard
because they believed that gold convertibility would be a signal to creditors of sound government finance
and the future ability to service debt.8
This was the case both for developing countries seeking access to long-term capital, such as
Austria-Hungary (Yeager, 1984) and Latin America (Fishlow, 1989), and for countries seeking short-term
loans, such as Japan, which financed the Russo-Japanese war of 1905-1906 with foreign loans seven years
after joining the gold standard (Hayashi, 1989). Once on the gold standard, these countries feared the
consequences of suspension (Eichengreen, 1992a, p.19; Fishlow 1987, 1989). The fact that England,
the most successful country of the nineteenth century, as well as other "progressive" countries were on
the gold standard, was probably a powerful argument for joining (Friedman, 1990; Gallarotti, 1993).
The operation of the "rules of the game," whereby the monetary authorities were supposed to
alter the discount rate to speed up the adjustment to a change in external balance, may also have been an
important part the commitment mechanism played under the international gold-standard rule. To the
extent the "rules" were followed and adjustment facilitated, the commitment to convertibility was
strengthened and conditions conducive to abandonment were lessened.
Evidence on the operation of the "rules of the game" questions their validity. Bloomfield (1959),
in a classic study, showed that, with the principal exception of England, the rules were frequently violated
in the sense that discount rates were not always changed in the required direction (or bysufficient
amounts) and in the sense that changes in domestic credit were often negatively correlatedwith changes
in gold reserves. In addition, a number of countries used gold devices —practicesto prevent gold
outflows.
One can reconcile the violation of the 'rules of the game' and the use of gold devices,with
maintenance of credibility in the commitment to gold, by viewing the gold points as a formof target zone
7(Ehengreen, 1994). Belief that intervention would occur at the upper and lower gold points created a
honeymoon effect whereby stabilizing capital flows caused the market exchange rate to revert towards
parity before reaching the gold points (Krugman, 1991). Within the zone, the monetary authorities could
alter discount rates to affect domestic objectives such as stabilizing real activity and smoothing interest
rates (Svennson, 1994). Moreover, for the major countries, at least before 1914, such policies were
not used extensively enough to threaten the convertibility into gold (Schwartz, 1984).
An additional enforcement mechanism for the international gold-standard rule may have been the
hegemonic power of England, the most important gold-standard country (Eichengreen, 1989). A
persistent theme in the Literature on the international gold standard is that the classical gold standard of
1880 to 1914 was a British-managed standard (Bordo, 1984). Because London was the center for the
world's principal gold, commodities, and capital markets, because of the extensive outstanding sterling-
denominated assets, and because many countries used sterling as an international reserve currency (as a
substitute for gold), it is argued that the Bank of England, by manipulating its bank rate, could attract
whatever gold it needed and, furthermore, that other central banks would adjust their discount rates
accordingly. Thus, the Bank of England could exert a powerful influence on the money supplies and
price levels of other gold-standard countries.
The evidence suggests that the Bank did have some influence on other European central banks
(Lindert, 1969). Eichengreen (1987) treats the Bank of England as engaged in a leadership role in a
Stackelberg strategic game with other central banks as followers. The other central banks accepted a
passive role because of the benefits to them of using sterling as a reserve asset. According to this
interpretation, the gold-standard rule may have been enforced by the Bank of England. Thus, the
monetary authorities of many countries may have been constrained from following independent
discretionary policies that would have threatened adherence to the gold-standard rule.
Indeed, according to Giovannini (1989), the gold standard was an asymmetric system. England
was the center country. It used its monetary policy (bank rate) to maintain gold convertibility. Other
countries accepted the dictates of fixed parities and allowed their money supplies to passively respond.
8His regressions support this view—the French and German central banks adapted their domestic policies
to external conditions, whereas the British did not.
The benefits to England as leader of the gold standard —fromseigniorage earned on foreign-held
sterling balances, from returns to financial institutions generated by its central position in the gold
standard and from access to international capital markets in wartime —weresubstantial enough to make
the costs of not following the rule extremely high.
Finally, Eichengreen (1992b) argues that episodic central bank cooperation may have also
strengthened the credibility of the gold standard. Lines of credit arranged between the Banque de France,
other central banks and the Bank of England during incipient financial crises such as 1890 and 1907 may
in turn have encouraged private stabilizing capital movements to offset threats to convertibility.
2.3 The Classical Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard and Bretton Woods
Eichengreen (1994) posits three prequisites for a successful international monetary arrangement:
the capacity to undertake relative price adjustment; adherence to robust monetary rules; and ability to
contain market pressures. According to him the classical gold standard contingent rule satisfied these
criteria for the core countries because the credible commitment to maintain convertibility above all else,
allowed the escape clause to accommodate major shocks, and because central bank cooperation eased
market pressures in the face of speculative attacks. By contrast, for peripheral countries, the credibility
of commitment to the gold standard was considerably weaker reflecting strong domestic political pressures
to alter exchange rates (Frieden, 1993).
Though gold convertibility was restored by 1926 by most countries, the interwar gold exchange
standard was a much less successful application of the specie standard rule. The escape clause could not
be invoked (lest it lead to destabilizing capital outflows), absent a credible commitment to maintain gold
parity in the face of a politicized money supply process and, according to Eichengreen (l992b), the
failure of cooperation.
The Bretton Woods international monetary system can also be viewed within the context of the
specie standard rule, although it is a distant variant of the original specie stzrndard. Under the rules of
Brertort Woods, only the U.S., as central reserve country and provider of the nominal anchor, was
9required to peg its currency to gold; the other members were required to peg their currencies to the dollar
(McKinnon, 1993). They also were encouraged to use domestic stabilization policy to offset temporary
disturbances. The Bretton Woods system had an escape clause for its members —achange in parity was
allowed in the face of a fundamental disequilibrium, which could encompass the contingencies under the
specie standard rule --butit was not the same as under the specie standard because it did not require
restoring the original parity.'0 The rule for members (other than the U.S.) was enforced, as under the
gold standard, by access to U.S. capita! and to the IMF's resources. For the U.S., there was no explicit
enforcement mechanism other than reputation and the commitment to gold convertibility. Capital controls
were viewed as a method to contain market pressures.
The system was successful as long as the U.S. maintained its commitment to convertibility (i.e.
maintained price stability). But the escape clause mechanism quickly proved defective since the
fundamental disequilibrium contingency was never spelled out and hence parity changes would be
accompanied by speculative attacks which became more serious as capital controls became increasingly
ineffective. Ultimately, by following highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies beginning in the
mid-i 960s, the U.S. attached greater importance to domestic concerns than to its role as the center of the
international monetary system, and the system collapsed.
Thus, although the Bretton Woods system can be interpreted as one based on rules, the system
did not provide a credible commitment mechanismU. The U.S. was unwilling to subsume domestic
considerations to the responsibility of maintaining a nominal anchor. At the same time other G-7
countries became increasingly unwilling to follow the dictates of the U.S.-imposed world inflation rate.
3. Chronolov of Adherence to and Suspension of SDecie Rules. Pre- and Post-Bretton
Woods
3.1. Design of Table!
Table 1 gives a snapshot record of the confonnity of 21 countries to specie rules —commitment
to a fixed parity with an escape clause. The table is in two segments, segment A referring tothe
extended period from the nineteenth century through the post-World War I interwar years, when specie
10rules were acknowledged, whether or not observed; segment B referring to the Bretton Woods era, when
specie rules were no longer acknowledged or observed (to a limited extent the United States was an
exception) but countries submitted to the rule that only in the case of fundamental disequilibrium was a
change in parity permissible. Countries did not lightly change par values of their currencies.
The countries are divided into two main groupings, 4 core countries and 17 peripheral countries.
Over the extended period covered by segment A, core countries were faithful to specie rules under the
classical gold standard from 1880 to 1914, but not invariably so in the decades before and after. The
peripheral countries, which are classified in the main according to geographical location, were
intermittently faithful over the extended period.
Segment A separates experience under a bimetallic or silver standard, which prevailed before the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, from experience under the gold standard that followed. For each
standard and each country the table shows dates when a commitment was made to convert the national
currency into specie, dates of suspension of the commitment, and the reasons for suspension. For the gold
standard an additional column indicates whether a change in parity was made on resumption of
convertibility after suspension. The column is omitted for bimetallic or silver experience because in these
cases we have not established the dates of devaluations or revaluations after resumptions. Segment B
dealing with Bretton Woods gives the dates each country (except for Switzerland, which was not a
member) declared its par value to the IMF, dates of suspension, if any, dates of change of par value, and
reasons for suspension or par change.
3.2. Evaluating Core Country Adherence to Specie Rules: Segment A
The four countries (in Part 1 of the table) that we designate as the core include France, Germany,
the U.K., and the U.S. We discuss first the record for these countries before they adopted the gold
standard. For the bimetallic/silver standard period, there are no entries for Germany, since it was not
11unified until 1871. The individual German states, however, were on a bimetallic standard, as were also
the other three core countries.
1803 is the entry in the table for the date of convertibility of the French franc into gold or silver.
A bimetallic system nevertheless predated that entry by centuries, but before 1803, France had endured
devaluations, revaluations, John Law's inflationary inconvertible paper money experiment, 1716-20, and
the revolutionary war assignat hyperintlation, 1789-95. So 1803 marks the beginning of a stable system,
with only two interruptions until 1878, when France switched to gold. The two interruptions were
suspensions in 1848-50, following the overthrow of the July monarchy, and 1870-78, following the
Franco-German war. Both of these interruptions qualify as consistent with adherence to specie rules, since
the suspensions were valid exercises of the escape clauses.
Although the table shows 1694, the year the Bank of England was founded, as the date for
convertibility of the British pound into silver, Britain was on a silver standard as far back as the thirteenth
century. De facto the country was on a gold standard from 1717 on, owing to the overvaluation of gold
by Sir Isaac Newton, the Master of the Mint; de jure the country adopted the gold standard in 1816,
while suspension of convertibility was still in effect. There had been banking crises in 1763, 1772, and
1783, but no suspensions until the war with France ended convertibility from 1797 to 1821. This again
we regard not as a breach of the rule but proper invocation of the escape clause not only for the duration
of the war but for a period of adjustment thereafter. Resumption at the prewar parity also respects the
rule (Bordo and Kydland, 1992).
Whether the United States is eligible for inclusion among core countries in the nineteenth century
is the subject of debate. We discuss the issue when we examine the status of the United States under the
classical gold standard. Having concluded for the later period that the United States belongs among core
countries, we also do not exclude it from the core group when it was on a bimetallic standard.
12The U.S. Coinage Act of 1792 defined the bimetallic standard at a mint ratio of 15 to 1. In 1834
and again in 1837 the mint ratio was altered, remaining unchanged thereafter at 16 to 1. Banking panics
in 1837 and 1857 led to temporary restriction of payments by banks but no suspension of convertibility.
The Civil War, however, occasioned suspension from 1862 through 1878. In 1873 there was a banking
panic, like the earlier ones, in which the banks restricted payments of high-powered paper money.
Despite contentious political opposition to deflation that resumption enforced, on January 1, 1879,
resumption was achieved at the prewar parity, in line with the declaration of the Resumption Act of 1875.
Under the classical gold standard both France and Germany observed specie rules until the
outbreak of World War 1. Each then suspended convertibility, and both devalued before resuming in the
1920s. Convertibility by France lasted for eight years, by Germany for seven years, and then both
devalued after suspending in 1931. The public probably regarded suspension per se because of war and
financial crisis as permissible under the escape clause. The change in parity, however, diluted the
credibility of the countries' attachment to specie rules.
The U.K. 's record before World War I is the epitome of proper conduct under the gold standard.
As the country at the center of the system, operating with a small gold reserve, it nevertheless managed
to serve both its domestic and international interests while maintaining convertibility. Three banking
panics in 1847, 1857, and 1866 led to suspension of the Banking Act of 1844, which limited the Bank
of England's fiduciary issue, but did no damage to the convertibility commitment. Thereafter the Bank
acted to defuse panics before they emerged, as in 1890 and 1907. Convertibility was abandoned by the
Bank in World War I (de facto in 1914 and dejure in 1919), taking advantage of the escape clause, and
the return to the gold standard at the prewar parity was delayed until 1925, also consonant with the
provisions of the escape clause. The convertibility commitment, however, lasted only for six years, and
devaluation followed.
13The view, alludedto above, that would exclude the United States as a member of the group of
corecountries, would shift it to the peripheral country group that includes Australia andCanada.That
view takes its cue in part from the silver agitation andlegislationof 1878 and 1890 that threatened the
convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold (Eichengreen, 1992b, 1994; Giovanini, 1993; Grilli, 1990).If
lasting damage to U.S. commitment credibility as a result of the threat had resulted, wewould concur.
Since the threat was a temporary one, and convertibility was never suspended, we conclu1e that the
United States, by the end of the nineteenth century a colossus on the world stage, belongs with the core.
Another reason advanced for excluding the United States from the core is that before 1914 it was
a net capital importer and hence more like Australia and Canada than the corecountries that provided the
capital. This is a narrow dimension by which to judge the U.S. relative economic importance.It was
wealthier and more populous than the U.K. under the classical gold standard, and certainly than France
and Germany. The United States was a capital exporter as well as an importer in the nineteenth century,
and by 1914 it was a net capital exporter. These considerations reinforce our conclusion that it is properly
a core country.
Apart from the silver threat, convertibility from 1879 to 1914 in the UnitedStates was never in
doubt. It was preserved even during two banking panics in 1893 and 1907 when banksrestricted
payments. In World War I the U.S. embargoed gold exports,1917-19, but did not otherwise attenuate
the gold standard. Specie rules were, however, flouted by the devaluation of the dollarin 1933. The
changed parity legislated in 1934 remained in effect until 1971.
The record of commitment by the core countries to specie rules is unblemishedunder the pre-
World War I gold standard. Neither France nor Germany played by those rules duringthe interwar
period, having resumed convertibility with devalued gold contentof their currencies. The U.K. reverted
to its prewar parity when it resumed convertibility in 1925 but by 1931devalued and abandoned rules
14for discretion. The U.S. followed the U.K. in devaluing in 1933 and adopted a gold standard in 1934 that
diverged in fundamental ways from the pre-Worid War I standard.
3.3.1. Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Specie Rules: Part 2. Segment A
Australia and Canada, the two countries that were sealed by the U.K. and were part of the
Empire, initially used the British currency system. Silver was the metallic medium in Australia before
it adopted the gold standard, but it is not clear that a silver standard prevailed. Convertibility at a fixed
Australian price of gold dated from 1852. Despite severe banking problems in the 1890s, Australia did
not suspend convertibility until July 1915 during World War I. It resumed, along with the U.K. in 1925,
at its prewar parity, and suspended at the end of 1929, when the world depression began. It devalued in
March 1930 (Butlin, 1986).
In Canada the first bank charters in 1821 required convertibility of bank notes into silver. A
financial crisis and political instability in 1837 led to suspension. Resumption occurred in 1839. Canada
adopted the gold standard in 1853 and, although it experienced a sharp cyclical downturn in 1907-08, it
did not suspend convertibility until 1914. However, no change was made in the statutory price of gold,
and the gold reserve requirement for Dominion notes was not suspended, hence expansionary domestic
monetary policy was subject to gold limits. Since export of gold was embargoed, exchange rates were
at a discount from prewar parities. Canada restored legal convertibility at the prewar parity in July 1926,
making the monetary adjustments to return to parity without a central bank. The de facto date of Canada's
suspension of gold convertibility was 1929 (Shearer and Clark, 1984, 300). Canadian banks could not
ship gold abroad, but foreign holders of Canadian currency obligations could redeem them in gold. Dc
jure suspension occurred in September 1931 when both internal and external gold convertibility ended.
Both Australia and Canada were as faithful as the core countries in adhering to the gold standard
before 1914, but devalued in the post-World War I period.
153.3.2. Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Specie Rules: Part 3. Segment A
The record of the three Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile does not match that
of Australia and Canada.
Before it adopted the gold standard, from 1822 to 1825 Argentina had a brief spell of
convertibility of bank notes. The metallic medium was silver and gold. Convertibility ended at atime
of large government expenditures related to a war with Brazil. For the following 35 years, a period of
continuing fiscal improvidence, there was no convertibility. Between 1862 and 1865 contractionary
monetary policy was in force.
Gold convertibility in Argentina began in February 1867 after a failed attempt in 1863 (see also
section 4 below). Convertibility was suspended in May 1876 after several years of political unrest and
rising government deficits. Although the exchange rate reached parity by 1881, resumptionthat year
failed. Convertibility was restored in 1883 but lasted only until January 1885, at a time of financial crisis
in Europe and following a period of expansionary fiscal policy. Again inconvertibility thereafteruntil
1899 was associated with lax fiscal policy leading to debt default in 1890. In 1899 convertibility was
restored with the return to fiscal orthodoxy in 1896 and the establishment of a form of currency board.
Argentina suspended convertibility in 1914 on the outbreak of war. At a changed parityit resumed in
August 1927, and suspended again in 1929. Inconvertibility prevailed duringthe balance of the interwar
period.
From 1808 onwards Brazil followed a bimetallic standard at the colonial ratio of 16:1. Fromthen
until 1846 when it was altered to favor gold, the ratio was changed three times. Gold convertibility was
suspended in November 1857 in the wake of a banking crisis, and resumed in1858. It was susequently
abandoned on several succeeding occasions (notably during the war with Paraguay). (Pelaezand Suzigan,
1976). It lasted for slightly more than a year in 1888-89. 1888 was the year slavery wasabolished. In
1888-89 capital inflows were extraordinarily large. A republican revolution in November1889 coincided
16with the ending of convertibility (Fritsch and Franco, 1992). The gold standard was identified with the
deposed monarchy, and the new government introduced a system of regional banks to increase the money
supply. The real exchange rate depreciated, and convertibility was suspended. As a condition for a large
funding loan from London bankers, Brazil was required to shift to contractionary fiscal and monetary
policies around the turn of the century.
In 1906 Brazil restored convertibility to prevent continued appreciation of the milreis exchange
rate that was harmful to coffee and rubber exporters. In addition it created a Conversion Office with a
limit set to its issue of convertible notes at a newly established parity. Brazil's external position
deteriorated in 1913, owing to falling coffee and rubber prices and shrinking international capital flows
following the Balkan wars. A cyclical decline lasted until the outbreak of World War I, when
convertibility ended tupreservethe gold holdings of the Conversion Office.
As was the case in 1906, resumption in 1926 was sought to prevent appreciation of the exchange
rate. It followed a program in 1925-26 to achieve monetary and fiscal discipline. As in the earlier case,
a Stabilization Office, modeled on the Conversion Office, was created to issue notes at the new parity.
The collapse of coffee prices in 1929 and the contraction in capital inflows led in late 1930 to an almost
complete loss of gold reserves by the Stabilization Office. Convertibility was then abandoned for the
duration of the remaining interwar years.
Chile was on a bimetallic standard from 1818 to 1851; it then made a technical change in the mint
ratio, continuing on the bimetallic standard until 1866, when it suspended. It resumed in 1870, but by
the end of 1874 with the fall in the price of silver, it was on a de facto silver standard. Bad crops during
the next three years, and accompanying balance of payments deficits, were followed by bank runs in
1878. The authorities made bank notes inconvertible on July 23, 1878 (Llona-Rodriguez, 1993).
For the next 17 years, Chile remained on a paper standard.In 1879 the War of the Pacific began,
with Chile opposing Bolivia and Peru, and ended in 1883 with Chile the victor. The war was financed
17by government note issues. Thanks to its seizure of provinces in the losing countries, Chile became the
world's monopoly producer of nitrate. However, declining prices of nitrate and copper in world markets
led to depreciation of the Chilean peso from 1883 to 1893, with the domestic inflation rate tower than
exchange rate depreciation.
The first attempt to return to a metallic standard was made in 1887, but it failed. To appreciate
the exchange rate, the government was required to retire its peso note issues and burn them, until the total
issue had been reduced from 25 to 18 million pesos. It was also required to establish a silver fund for
the eventual redemption of the outstanding amount. Bank issues were to be reduced from 150 percent to
100 percent of net worth, but neither margin was a real restraint. Bank notes rose and so did government
notes.
An 8-month Civil War from January to August 1891 resulted in further monetary expansion and
exchange rate depreciation. A second conversion law in November 1892 was strictly implemented and
the exchange rate appreciated, but again the government responded to political discontent by issuing
notes. The exchange rate thereupon depreciated. A new conversion law of February 11, 1895, set June
1 as the day for redemption of government notes, devalued the gold content of the peso, and authorized
loans and sales of nitrate fields to accumulate a gold reserve. Bank notes, with limits on the authorized
total, had to be backed by gold or bonds to be acceptable for taxes. As a result, the banks contracted
and the money supply shrank.
Following rumors of war with Argentina and a run on the banks in July 1898, the legislature
ended convertibility and, to deal with the panic, bank notes were declared government obligations. Chile
did not resume until 1925, when it again devalued, and in 1931 it abandoned the gold standard.
Common elements in the experiences of the Latin American ABC countries that made their
adherence to the gold standard chancy were war and threats of war and fiscal and monetary policies
incompatible with fixed exchange rates.
18It is difficult, however, to isolate policy from balance of payments problems that were their lot
as exporters of primary products whose prices were set in world markets. Whereas for core countries war
was a contingency that justified abandonment of the standard, it was a temporary abandonment with the
commitment to return to it; for the Latin American peripheral countries, not only the aftermath of war
but deflation generally were reasons for absence of commitment to convertibility.
3.3.3. Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Specie Rules. Part 4. Segment A
Except for Greece and Portugal, the record of adherence to specie rules is mainly blank for Italy
and Spain, the Southern European countries included in Table 1.
For 42 out of the 52 years between 1833 and 1885 when it adopted the gold standard, Greece was
on a bimetallic standard. Until 1828 it had no national currency; Turkish coins were themedium of
exchange. A commercial bank, established in 1842, operated de facto as a central bank (Lazaretou, 1994).
Convertibility prevailed from February 1833 to March 1848, when suspension was declared for
the balance of the year in response to panic worldwide. Resumption in January 1849 lasted through
December 1868. Although Greece signed on as a member of the Latin Monetary Union in April 1867,
it did not formally participate until November 1882, when it defined 1 drachina as equivalent to 1 French
franc.
Greece suspended for a year and a half until July 1870 because of revolution in Crete,which
remained under Turkish occupation until 1899. It resumed in August 1870 until May 1877, whichmarked
the end of its bimetallic experience. From June 1877 through December 1884, suspension wasassociated
with the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78. After the war ended, Greece made several attempts to resume,
cutting back on monetary growth, while the government increased indirect taxes toraise revenues. From
1879 to 1884 it borrowed 360 million gold French francs. In 1882, it devalued thedrachma.
19Despite gold outflows because of high interest payments and a trade crisis at the end of 1884,
Greece adopted the gold standard at that time. Convertibility, however, failed as gold outflows persisted,
and by September 1885 Greece reverted to a paper money standard and floating exchange rates.
Continued borrowing from France until 1891 and low tax revenues led to debt default in December 1893.
The defeat of Greece in 1897 in the war with Turkey, which saddled it with a huge war indemnity
payable in funds convertible into gold, was the spur for the appointment in 1898 of an International
Committee for Greek debt management. The Committee imposed fiscal prudence on the government, and
a loan of 150 million gold French francs was arranged to enable Greece to pay the war indemnity to
Turkey.
These measures restored confidence in Greek monetary and fiscal policies. A law of March 1910
required note circulation above a statutory ceiling to be backed by gold or foreign exchange. Bank notes
were to be convertible into French francs at parity, and official reserves of the National Bank of Greece
were stipulated as mainly interest-bearing deposits denominated in foreign currencies. In April 1910
Greece resumed convertibility on the gold exchange standard.
The new standard was successful until December 1914. Money creation then financed wartime
spending. Exchange rate parity was maintained until reserves were depleted by August 1919. Exchange
rates floated until May 1928, when Greece returned to the gold exchange standard. It instituted foreign
exchange controls in September 1931 and devalued in April 1932, when convertibility ended.
Italy, unlike Greece, adhered to a specie standard only for 14 years during the 52 yearsbefore
World War I but operated a paper standard during most of the rest of the period as if subject to specie
constraints. In 1862 it adopted the bimetallic standard, although de facto the standard was gold. In 1865
Italy joined the Latin Monetary Union. Fiscal improvidence and war against Austriain 1866, however,
ended convertibility (Fratianni and Spinelli, 1984).
20Fiscal and monetary discipline was achieved by 1874, and exchange rate parity was restored. The
government announced on March 1, 1883, that it would restore convertibility on April 12, 1884,but
convertibility took place only in silver because silver was overvalued at the mint. Public finances then
deteriorated and unlawful bank issues indicated an absence of monetary discipline. By 1894 Italy was
back on a paper standard, and floating exchange rates. Inconvertibility lasted until 1913. After periods
of laxity, the government embraced fiscal and monetary rectitude as if it were on a gold standard.
Italy did not return to the gold standard until December 1927. It resorted to foreign exchange
controls in May 1934, and devalued in October 1936.
Portugal was runner-up to Greece in the number of years it adhered to specie rules (Reis, 1992).
It had been on a bimetallic standard since the 1680s with de facto gold predominance alternating with de
facto silver predominance. In 1846 it was a weak country facing a civil war, and in no position to mint
its own coin to any great extent. Instead, Portugal legalized silver coinage from other countries and set
a new gold parity for the milreis at 4.5 to the pound sterling that effectively ensuredthat English money
would mainly be the foreign inflow. England was Portugal's chief trading partner and creditor, to whom
it shipped English coin to settle its accounts. Furthermore, the mint ratio the law established favored gold.
The decision to shift to a gold standard in 1854 was made by the government as the most
convenient for Portugal since gold circulation was ample, and Bank of Lisbon paper that hadbeen
circulating at a discount was virtually back to par. The parity with the pound was unchangedfrom 1854
until 1891, during which there were no convertibility crises. Gold coins circulated, notes and deposits
constituting a minor proportion of the money supply. Yet Portugal's balanceof trade, except for one
year, was in deficit, and it was a net capital importer. Moreover,the government budget was typically
short of revenue, but until 1890 Portugal succeeded in borrowing long-term funds athome or abroad to
cover the shortfall.
21In addition to borrowings, Portugal offset the negative elements in its balance of payments by
remittances from Brazil and by earnings on Portuguese foreign investments. Thus Portugal, a debtor
nation, was a regular importer of gold, unlike other peripheral nations. All this caine to a halt in 1891,
after which it was no longer able to raise foreign loans. An increase in the ratio of its debt service
payments to revenues, and government support of failing Portuguese enterprisesclouded its reputation
as a creditworthy nation. The finance minister in office at this juncture was a soft-money silver supporter,
which did not help Portugal's credit standing. Portugal's suspension of convertibility in 1891 lasted until
after World War I.
It returned to gold in July 1931 at a devalued parity and suspended two months later with
England.
Although Spain adopted a bimetallic regime in April 1848, it was not until the currency reform
of 1868 thai established the peseta as the monetary unit that the regime was fully operative (Martin
Acena, 1993). In 1868 the gold-silver ratio was set at 15.5:1, as in the Latin MonetaryUnion (which
Spain did not join), whereas the 16:1 ratio set in 1848 was followed by sixreductions in the intervening
years. The Bank of Spain in 1874 became the monopoly issuerof bank notes that were freely convertible
into both gold and silver.
With the fall in the market price of silver in the 1870s, the 15.5:1 ratio undervalued gold.Gold
was driven out of circulation, and the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain declined,but until mid-1883
trade surpluses and capital imports sustained convertibility. Because foreign holdersof Spanish bonds
refused to accept the terms of a conversion the Treasury was engaged in at the time,there was a capital
outflow and a fall in inflows. In addition, the trade balance declined sharply from 1881 to1883. To avoid
deflation, Spain ended convertibility.
Between 1888 and 1900 the peseta exchange rate depreciated, a budget deficit arosein every year
but three from 1884 to 1899, the war with Cuba in 1898-99 was fmanced largely by moneycreation, and
22Spanish prices until 1905 fell much less than world prices —allfactors hostile to resumption. These
factors mainly after 1900 turned favorable to resumption, but it did not take place. Efforts by finance
ministers to restore convertibility and adopt the gold standard before World War I foundered on the
opposition of the Bank of Spain. Unlike other countries, Spain did not even briefly during the interwar
period turn to gold convertibility. It adopted foreign exchange controls in May 1931.
3.3.4 Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Specie Rules. Part 5.SegmentA
The Scandinavian countries were as faithful adherents to the classical gold standard as were the
core countries. Sweden and Denmark were independent countries throughout the period. Only Sweden
of the group has a monetary history available to us for the early nineteenth century, and its record of
respect for specie rules during that period is not inferior to that of the core.
Sweden had a silver standard from 1803 to 1809. Large budget deficits to finance a war with
Russia in 1808 bloated the money supply. in 1809 convertibility was suspended. A silver standard was
not restored until 1834. Ii lasted until 1873 when Sweden adopted gold. The four Scandinavian countries
show a common pattern of adoption of the gold standard between 1872 and 1877 and adherence to the
standard until 1914.
Even during the period when the four countries adopted the gold standard, Finland and Norway
were not independent The former was an autonomous grand duchy of the Russian empire until 1917,the
latter part of Sweden until 1905.
The Swedish constitution guaranteed the convertibility of the central bank's notes into gold, as
noted in Section 2.1 above. For a change in gold standard arrangements to be adopted Parliament had
to give its assent at two different dates with an election intervening. The central bank'sdecision in 1914
to make the notes inconvertible was unconstitutional since the bank disregarded the provisionfor
Parliamentary approval.
23Only Finland devalued on resumption in 1926. The others resumed at their prewar parities.
Sweden returned to gold de jure in March 1924, but de facto the prewar par rate of the krona in gold was
restored in 1922. \Vhat delayed the de jure return was the authorities' opposition to the krona as the sole
convertible European currency. All the Scandinavian countries suspended in 1931 and devalued. In June
1933 the Swedish krona was fixed to the British pound, and the exchange rate was unchanged untilafter
the start of World War H.
3.3.5. Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Specie Rules. Part 5. Segment A
The three Western European countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, adopted the
gold standard in the second half of the 1870s and adhered to it until WorldWar I.
A note-issuing bank was established in Belgium in 1822 before it became independent in 1832,
when it was a bimetallic adherent. It suspended convertibility in 1848 in the face of French politicaland
financial problems. The Netherlands was on a bimetallic standard in 1847, Switzerland in 1850.
All three countries suspended convertibility in 1914. Belgium lost the right of note issuewhen
the Germans took over. Switzerland declared bank notes legal tender in 1914. The Netherlands prohibited
gold export in 1914. Belgium devalued when it returned to gold in October 1926,and devalued again
in March 1935. The Netherlands returned to gold at the prewar parity in April 1925and devalued in
October 1936. Switzerland did not devalue in 1929 when it returned to gold but whenit left the gold
standard in 1936 it did.
3.3.6. Evaluating Japan's Adherence to Specie Rules. Part 5. Segment A
Convertibility was not firmly established in Japan until 1885, when it was on asilver standard
(Shinjo, 1962).
In 1868 Japan introduced a new monetary unit, the yen, defmed as the same weightand fineness
as the Mexican silver dollar. In an act of 1871 Japan prescribed a gold yen,but silver still remained the
preferred metal for foreign trade. Bimetallism was in effect as judged bythe government's metallic
24reserve. The government issued notes beginning in 1868 that were redeemable in silver, with an 1880
expiration date of redemption. In addition, government-issued currency notes were inconvertible)2
New national banks were created late in 1872 to issue bank notes against specie reserves of not
less than two-thirds the amount emitted. The notes, however, quickly returned to the banks for
redemption in silver. The petition in 1875 of four existing national banks to change from silver to
government currency note convertibility was granted the following year. National banks multiplied and
their issues sharply increased)3
From 1868 until 1878 the paper currency depreciated against both silver and gold. The
government issue ceased in 1879. It was recognized that a budget surplus was essential to decrease the
outstanding note issue and to accumulate specie. By 1881, after keeping government expenditure constant
for three years, the government budget was in surplus, used partly to destroy existing notes and the rest
as specie reserve.
In October 1882 the Bank of Japan was founded, but it did not issue convertible notes, payable
in silver on demand, until 1885. These notes, initially limited in amount, replaced government currency
notes. In 1888 the bank was authorized to issue a substantial fiduciary circulation backed by government
and commercial paper, any amounts in excess to be backed by gold and silver. National banks lost the
right of issue after the expiration of their charters. Deposit banks replaced them.
The premium on silver disappeared once convertibility was established but, since the price of
silver against gold was declining, the exchange rate against gold standard countries was unstable. By 1893
Japan recognized that it was desirable to adopt the gold standard, but the reform was notintroduced until
the indemnity in gold China paid for losing the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 enabled the government
to acquire an adequate reserve.
25The Coinage Act of 1897 established the gold standard. The act governing the Bank of Japan was
revised to require convertibility of its notes into gold instead of silver. The government contributed the
gold indemnity to the bank's reserve. Silver was limited to one-fourthof the specie reserve.
Japan adhered to the gold standard until September 1917, without interruption despite runs on
banks in 1901 and 1907-08, war with Russia in 1904-05, extraordinary government expendituresfinanced
by foreign loans, an unfavorable balance of payments during mostof the period. The decrease in the
specie reserve prompted flotation of foreign bonds in London andParis in every year from 1906 to 1915.
Foreign capital maintained Japan's gold standard.
Japan was a beneficiary of the demand for its goods and services byWorld War I belligerents.
It used the surplus in its balance of payments to increase the Bank of Japan's andthe government's gold
reserves, to replenish its foreign exchange balances abroad, to payback foreign loans, and to increase
its foreign investments. Japan became a creditor country.
In September 1917 Japan followed the United States in embargoing gold and silver export.Bank
of Japan notes became inconvertible. Wartime prosperity ended in 1920, with failuresof firms and runs
on banks. A deflationary policy in 1921-22 provoked further runs onbanks, and the policy was
discontinued. An earthquake in September 1923 led to increased government expenditures. Againthere
was a move to deflation and a readiness to follow England's return to goldin April 1925. Financial panic
in 1926 halted that step. A new government in 1929 adopted a program of liftingthe gold embargo and
returning to gold at the prewar parity, as it did in January 1930.
Speculative transactions to sell yen and buy dollars once the goldstandard was restored reflected
the market's belief that the yen would have to be devalued. The suspensionof the gold standard in
December 1931 came after huge gold losses by Japan. In March1932 Japan began a series of
devaluations of the gold content of the yen as the exchange rate of the yendeclined. Foreign exchange
26controls were introduced in May 1933. The limit on the Bank of Japan's fiduciary note issue was
repeatedly expanded, and ultimately eliminated.
3.4, Evaluating Core Country Adherence to Rules: Segment B
Under Brerton Woods, the rule for countries other than the United States was that a change in
par value was permissible to correct fundamental disequilibrium. Thoug1i undefined,the term was
intended to refer to disturbances other than government policies that justified a change in par. Examples
of such disturbances were a change in the terms of trade and in productivity trends, and other
contingencies similar to those the gold standard escape clauses encompassed. Obtaining the advance
agreement of the IMF to a change in par was a way of insuring that such werethe disturbances that
prompted the action (Eichengreen, 1994).
As is well known, the Bretton Woods arrangements required countries other than the United
States to peg their currencies to the dollar, and the United States to peg the dollar to gold. The system
became fully operative in 1959 and broke down in 1971. The rules for neither the center nor the other
countries were successful (Bordo, 1993a; Giovanini, 1993).
Problems raised by the rule for countries other than the United States were apparent from the start
of the system. We review the problems as evidenced by core country performance. WhenFrance
devalued in January 1948, it did not seek IMF authorization. By creating multiple exchange rates,it took
a discretionary action, contrary to the rule. It then restored unified exchange ratesin the devaluation of
1949. The U.K. announced convertibility for current account transactions in July 1947, but suspended
the next month, making sterling subject to exchange controls. It declared a parvalue in 1948, but
devalued in September 1949 by a larger percent than it had indicated to the IMF.
After the general realignment of September 1949, in which Germany joined, changesin par of
the core countries were rare, possibly due to reluctance to alter their parities after the experienceof the
speculative attacks that occurred after the 1949 changes. Keynesian full-employmentpolicies that many
27countries adopted conflicted with Bretton Woods obligations to maintain fixed exchange rates. In
consequence, exchange rate crises erupted as market participants anticipated policy-induced pressuresto
devalue or revalue. The countries whose currencies the market targeted for attack resisted changing par
values in the belief that domestic concerns should not yield to external concerns. Theytried to buy time
by imposing capital controls and deploying international reserves to preserveexisting par values, but in
the end failed. The meaning of fundamental disequilibrium, however, was altered torefer to government
monetary and fiscal policies that were inconsistent with those parvalues. As events unfolded, it was
difficult to distinguish the original correct use from this incorrect use of the escapeclause.
The core country par values that changed reflected this shift in the meaningof fundamental
disequilibrium. Two examples are France, under inflationary conditions,which devalued in 1957 and
1958, and the U.K.. Chronic U.K. balance of payments deficits during the1960s led to devaluation of
sterling in November 1967, despite rescue packages. France suspendedthe par value of the franc in
November 1968 because of speculative attacks on its currency in conditions of social unrestand inflation.
Capital controls and massive international loans were not effectivein preventing devaluation in August
1969. In contrast, Germany in response to a persistent balance of payments surplus reflecting higher
productivity than her partners revalued in 1961. In 1968 it resorted toborder taxes and restricted capital
inflows, but ultimately revalued in September 1969.
During 1969-71 a persistent outflow of funds from the United Statesoverwhelmed foreign
exchange markets. In May 1971 Germany suspended dealings inD-marks and allowed its currency to
float, since it could not maintain exchange rates within the established margins.France introduced dual
exchange rates in August 1971, and the U.K. suspended the sterling parvalue that month, and allowed
sterling to float in June 1972.
If countries other than the United States did not observe the BrettonWoods rule on par value
change as it was conceived, neither did the United States,the center country, comply with the gold
28convertibility rule. Faced with balance of payments deficits after 1957 that increased dollar liabilities
while the monetary gold stock was shrinking, the problem for the United States was how to preserve
convertibility. Many stratagems were devised to induce holders of dollars to refrain from cashingthem
in for gold. In addition, the elimination of the gold reserve requirement against Federal Reserve notes
in 1968 betokened a weakening of the commitment mechanism to maintain stable money —anobligation
of the reserve country. Moreover, by engaging in expansionary monetary policy after the mid-1960s, the
United States exacerbated the convertibility problem since the incentive to hold dollars declined as
inflation rose. The closing of the gold window in August 1971 marked the end of the convertibilityrule
and the readjustment of currency parities at the Smithsonian meeting in December 1971 markedthe first
dollar devaluation since 1934.
3.5. Evaluating Peripheral Country Adherence to Rules. Segment B
Like the core countries, peripheral countries under the Bretton Woods system differed inthe
extent to which they adopted expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Highinflation countries
repeatedly devalued; low inflation countries did not.
Australia, at the start of the Bretton Woods era, was part of the sterling area. Alongwith the
U.K. it declared the par value of its pound in 1947 and devalued in 1949. In 1966 it changedits currency
unit to the Australian dollar, as it converted its currency to the decimal system. No appreciationor
depreciation of the exchange rate accompanied the new monetary unit.Australia did not devalue with the
U.K. in 1967. It suspended its par value in August 1971, but did not change it, soits currency
appreciated relative to the U.S. dollar from the par value that existedbefore the closing of the U.S. gold
window.
Canada declared its par value at the end of 1946 and devalued with the U.K.in 1949. It acquired
a special status under Bretton Woods when the IMF did not actively opposeits decision to float its dollar
i1 September 1950. Capital inflows from the United States were increasingCanada's reserves, with
29expansionary consequences for its money supply. Under fixed exchange rates Canada found it difficult
to resist the inflationary results. It did not revert to fixed exchange rates until May 1962. In May 1970
Canada again decided to float for the same reason as it did two decades earlier. Its foreign exchange
reserves were accelerating, and the situation that was created thereby was deemed unmanageable under
fixed rates. Canada continued to float until the collapse of Bretton Woods.
The Latin American countries all had high inflation experiences during the Bretton Woods era.
Before Argentina declared its par value in 1957 it had in 1955 introduced multiple exchange rates. It
devalued in 1959, 1962, and 1970. Brazil was plagued by inflation from World War!! on and especially
after 1958. It devalued in 1967, and in August 1968 introduced a flexible exchange rate policy which
involved devaluation of the currency by small amounts at frequent irregular intervals. Similarly, Chile,
which declared its par value in 1946, introduced multiple exchange rates in 1953 and devalued in 1962.
Of the four Southern European countries, only Spain devalued before 1971. It did so in
November 1967. The IMF regarded the devaluation as a correction of a previously existing fundamental
disequilibrium. In 1971 Spain maintained its par value unchanged but widened the margin to upto 2
1/4%
Only Sweden of the Scandinavian countries did not devalue between 1951,the date of par
declaration, and 1971. Denmark devalued in 1949 and 1967. Finland devalued in 1957 and 1967. Norway
devalued in 1949.
In Western Europe Belgium and the Netherlands realigned with Germany in 1949and the latter
revalued with Germany in 1961.
Japan did not devalue between 1949, when it declared its par value,and 197'l.
3.6. Conclusion
The chronology of adherence to rules before and after Bretton Woods reveals a decayof respect
for rules over the century Table I covers. Rules were not universally honored even duringthe classical
30gold standard era. A core group of countries was usually faithful to specie rules, but countries in Western
Europe, the new Anglo settlement countries, and the Scandinavian countries also conducted their financial
affairs so that the fixed price of gold that defined their currencies was unchanged for extended periods.
Monetary and fiscal policies in the remaining countries in the table were such that suspensions of the
specie rule were not exceptional, and they were followed by changes in the former parity. Only
extraordinary events like wars occasioned departures from the standard among the core and their cohorts
and until World War I resumption took place at the prewar parity.
In the interwar period a return to the gold standard was sometimes at the earlier parity, but often
at a devalued rate. During most of the period floating exchange rates were common. The attempt under
Bretton Woods to impose a rule that the par value of its currency with the dollar that each country
member declared would be changed only under extraordinary circumstances as under the classical gold
standard failed. Domestic economic objectives proved to be paramount to international obligations.
4. Capital Flows and Specie Standard Adherence:
Argentina and the United States. 1865-1914
One of the enforcement mechanisms of the specie standard rule for peripheral countries was
presumably access to the capital needed for their economic development from the core countries.
Adherence to the convertibility rule would be viewed by lenders as evidence of financial probity —i.e.
membership in the international gold standard would be like 'the good housekeeping' seal of approval.
It would signal that a country followed prudent fiscal and monetary policies and would only temporarily
run large fiscal deficits in well understood emergencies. Moreover, the monetary authoritieswould be
willing to go to considerable lengths to avoid defaulting on externally held debt.It would also
presumably be a signal to the lenders in London and other metropolitan areas that the groupsin power
observed similar standards of financial rectitude.
31This suggests that adherence to the specie standard rule, ceteris paribus, would make a difference
in the volume of capital a country attracted from abroad. Presumably loans would onlybe made with
gold clauses (or be sterling denominated) so that currencyrisk would not matter. But there still would
be a risk of abrogation of the gold clauses or of total default on the debt. That eventualitywould be
reflected in a risk premium on the loan. In that case it would be attractive to a potentialborrower to
adhere to the specie standard rule as a signal of financial responsibility to induce thelender to lower the
risk premium. 'Buta more fundamental problem could arise in a world of asymmetricinformation
with the possibility of a lemons premium' (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).In that case,
charging a high interest rate might attract borrowers willing to engagein unduly risky projects. Lenders
faced with imperfect information on the borrowers' likely actions would then bereluctant to lend at any
price. A credible commitment to the specie standard rule, asevidenced by the holding of substantial gold
reserves, would provide a signal to lenders of the costs borrowerswould be willing to bear to avoid
default, and hence would circumvent the aversion to lending imposed by asymmetricinformation.
As a tentative step in the direction of examining the connection between capitalflows and
adherence to the specie standard rule, we briefly focus on the experience of two majorborrowers of
British capital in the late nineteenth century, each of which had a record of suspensionand of specie
standard adherence over the period 1865-1914 —Argentinaand the United States. In that fifty year
period, Argentina was off gold in three episodes of suspension totalling twentyfour years (excluding the
general breakdown of the international gold standard in 1914).The U.S. was off gold for seventeen
years and the gold standard subsequently wasunder threat of suspension for another seven years.
In figures 1 and 2 we present annual data on capital calls on new issuesof securities —ameasure
of access to new capital in London for the two countries. The data, kindly suppliedby Lance Davis,
underlying Davis and Huttenback's (1986) study of the economicsof British imperialism, are expressed
32in millions of current U.S. dollars.'6 The periods of suspension (and for the U.S. the episode of silver
threat to the gold standard) are marked off in the figures by shaded areas.
An ideal analysis of the influence of adherence to the specie standard rule would be based on a
model of the determinants of capital flows, including such variables as: the expected real rates of return
in both countries, the levels of real activity, the terms of trade, and the phase of the business cycle (see
Ford, 1962; Abramowitz, 1973; Edelstein, 1982). One could then test for the marginal influence of
adherence/non adherence to the rule. Here our aims are much more modest —tosimply compare the
annual capital calls on new issues of securities with a chronology of events related to adherence to the
rule .Any connection revealed should be treated merely as highly suggestive.
Bertalomé Mitre became president of Argentina in 1862 and succeeded in unifying the country
after five decades of intermittent civil strife, external wars and highly unstable monetary and fiscal
policies (Cortes-Condé, 1989). Under Mitre, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies were successful
in achieving specie convertibility in 1867 (following a failed attempt in 1863). Argentina then began five
decades of extraordinary economic growth with rapid development in agriculture, transportation, and
commerce. It also was the start of a wave of immigration from Europe and of the massive inflow of
capital (Cortes-Condé, 1986). The pattern for Argentina in Figure 1 reveals little change in capital flows
from a low and stable level when the country joined the gold standard in 1867 until 1876. The period
1870-75 is characterized by a mild boom in capital calls, ending just before suspension of convertibility
in 1876. Ii would be difficult to disentangle the effect of establishing convertibility in 1867 from that of
restoring political stability as the key determinants of the beginning of capital flows from Europe.
Increasing civil strife in 1873-76, rising government deficits, and a downturn in the world
business cycle account for the suspension of convertibility in 1876. It was followed by several years of
negligible capital inflows. Thanks to contractionary fiscal policy in the late 1870's, the exchange rate
reached parity in 1881 but it took until 1883 to restore convertibility (Cortes-Condé, 1989). The
33commitment to restore convertibility may have led to the observed resumption of capital inflows.
Convertibility was shortlived, however. Expansionary fiscal policy in 1884 led to a crisis and suspension
on January 1, 1885. Again suspension is associated with a decline in capital flows but the significant
rebound from 1886 to 1889 under inconvertible money suggests that British investors placed more weight
on the long-run economic prosperity of the Argentine economy than currency stability. The boom ended
with a crash in 1890, following several years of exceedingly loose fiscal policy and the creation in 1887
of a free banking system which produced a plethora of bank money (Eichengreen 1992b). A revolution
in that year, followed by default on external debt, precipitated the Baring crisis in London. Capital
inflows then plummeted until the authorities again instituted monetary and fiscal austerity. It took four
years for convertibility to be restored in 1899. Restoration of convertibility along with the creation of
a quasi currency board (the Caja de Conversion), which in essence tied the hands of the monetary
authorities, succeeded in creating a climate conducive to the resumption of significant capital movements
until World War 1.
This narrative suggests that adherence to the rule by Argentina may have had some marginal
influence on capital calls on new issues of securities in London before 1890 (see Table 2 which suggests
that the mean of capital calls in current and real dollars was higher during periods of adherence than of
suspension), but that the key determinant was the opening up of the country's vast resources to economic
development once unification and a modicum of political stability were achieved. The 1890 crisis was
a major shock to investor confidence and it took years of austerity, the restoration of convertibility, and
the establishment of a currency board before British investors' confidence was restored.
The U.S. experience under suspension has been well studied by others (Sharkey, 1959; Unger,
1964; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Roll, 1972; Calomiris, 1988). As can be seen in Figure 2 capital
calls on new issues were low in the first five years after the Civil War. The debate over resumption in
these years seems to have had little impact on the decision by investors to purchase securities in London
34destined for the United States, but then purchases picked up significantly in 1870 and 1871. This
phenomenon may be explained by the Public Credit Act of 1869 which guaranteed that the principal on
U.S. government bonds would be payable in gold (Calomiris, 1988). The subsequent decline may reflect
adverse news of the likelihood of resumption with the reversal in 1871 of an earlier Supreme Court
decision declaring the issue of greenbacks unconstitutional, as well as the Treasury's expansionary fiscal
policy (Calomiris, 1993). Capital calls increase until they are reversed by the Panic of 1873, a decline
in economic activity, and two years of soft money victories (the reissue of retired greenbacks in 1873 and
the Inflation Bill of 1874). The Resumption Act of 1875 is then followed in the next two years by the
largest increase in capital inflows over the whole fifty-year span. Resumption of specie payments on
January 1, 1879, is followed by a rising but variable trend in capital calls on new issues but the volume
is well below the average of the suspension period (see Table 2).
The period 1890-96 is important in the history of U.S. adherence to the rule. Passage of the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1890 led to a six-year period of uncertainty surrounding the nation's
ability to remain on the gold standard (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Calomiris, 1993; Grilli, 1990).
This episode is reflected in the capital calls on new issue series in figure 2. They peak in 1890 and
though they may have rallied following the repeal of the silver purchase part of the Sherman Silver Act
in 1893, and the Belmont Morgan syndicate replenishment of the Treasury's goldreservesin 1895, they
rebound significantly only after the 1900 Gold Standard Act.
In sum, for the U.S. as for Argentina, events suggesting the restoration of convertibility during
suspension and threats to convertibility during adherence seem to be associated with increases and
declines in capital calls on new issues of securities in London. More systematic research is required to
distinguish these influences from the fundamental determinants of capital flows.
355. The Economic Performance of Core and Peripheral Countries under Alternative
Monetary Regimes
In this section of the paper we present some evidence based on annual data over the past one
hundred and ten years on the macroeconomic performance of the four core countries and seventeen
peripheral countries during the classical gold standard (1880-1914) and three successive monetary
regimes: the Interwar period (1919-1939); the Bretton Woods international monetary system (1946-1970);
and the recent managed float (1974-1990). The Bretton Woods system, as a variant of the contingent
specie standard rule, is directly comparable to the classical gold standard. The recent managedfloat, a
regime not based on the rule, and the interwar period, which comprises episodesof free floating,
adherence to the gold standard, and managed floating, are presented as contrasts to the two rule-based
regimes.17 The data are organized in the seven groupings shown in Table 1, as well as broader
aggregates.
Such evidence for the classical gold standard regime and for Bretton Woods may shed light on
whether differing economic performance can explain why some countries successfully adhered tothe
convertibility rule and others did not, or whether adherence/nonadherence to the rule may haveinfluenced
performance. By contrast, under the recent floating regime we seek to determinewhether the observed
differences between countries' performance under convertible regimes persist in the absence ofrules.
5.1Stability and Convergence
Tables 3 through 5 present descriptive statistics on three macro variables for each country
pertinent to the issue of adherence to convertibility rules, thedata for each variable converted to a
continuous annual series from 1880 to 1989. The three variables are: the rateof inflation (GNP
deflators), money growth, and the ratio of Government expenditure lessGovernment Revenues to
GNP.'8 The definition of the variable used, e.g., M1 versus M2, was dictated by the availabilityof data
over the entire period. For each variable, and each country we present two summarystatistics: the mean
36and standarddeviation.For each of the seven country groupings from Table 1, and four aggregate
groupings (all countries, all except the four core countries; the 0-10 countries plusSwitzerland [G-l 1];
and all except the G-1l) we show as a summary statistic: the grand mean. We comment on thestatistical
results for each variable.
5.1.1Inflation (Table 3)
The classical gold standard had the lowest rate of inflation of any monetary regimefor all 21
countries and the interwar period displayed mild deflation for all except Latin America.Within the
classical gold standard regime, the inflation rate was lowest in countries identified in Table I as following
the convertibility rule: the four core countries; some of the different European groupingsand the Anglo
countries of new settlement. It was considerably higher in Latin America and Japan. This pattern can
also be seen in a comparison of the 0-10 plus Switzerland aggregate (an expanded core group)with the
other peripheral countries. The former grouping contains nine countries whichfollowed the rules; the
latter only three.
Under Bretton Woods, like the gold standard, a distinct difference can be observed betweenthe
core countries and a number of other groupings (Anglo new settlement,other Western Europe, Japan),
which had low inflation; and a set of countries with higher inflation (Latin America, to alesser extent
countries in Southern Europe and Scandinavia). This observed difference between country groupingsalso
is found under the recent float. The evidence on inflation suggests that if the speciestandard rule or its
variant did provide a credible commitment mechanism for low inflation, it was strongestin the gold
standard period followed by Bretton Woods. Within these regimes observanceof the rule clearly
demarcates inflation performance between countries.
The gold standard period had the most stable inflation rate of any regime (acrossall countries)
judged by the standard deviation. This was followed by BrettonWoods, the interwar and then the float.
For the 0-11 countries, the recent float is the most stable period. Within the goldstandard regime, core
37countries and countries following the specie standard rule exhibited greater price stability than the others.
For Bretton Woods a similar difference between country groupings is observed, with Japan joining the
stable inflation group, and Southern Europe the unstable inflation group. These differences persist into
the recent float.
The evidence of a high degree of price stability under the gold standard (and to a lesser extent
underBrettonWoods) and of greater price stability during those periods in countries following the rules
compared to those that did not is consistent with the traditional view that commodity-money-based
regimes provide a stable nominal anchor; however, the price stability observed may also reflect the
absence of major shocks.
5.1.2Money Growth (M) Table 4.
It was considerably more rapid across all countries post-World War II than before the war. For
the core countries and most of the G-l I countries there is not much difference between Bretton Woods
and the subsequent floating regime. Southern Europe, Latin America and Japan exhibited considerably
higher money growth under Bretton Woods than the others. For the Latin American countries money
growth rates accelerated over the entire postwar period reaching their highest levels under the float. By
contrast with the postwar, the gold standard exhibited lower money growth in both core and peripheral
countries alike with the principal exception of Japan; however, it was still higher in core than peripheral
countries. The observance of lower money growth in both core and peripheral countries may be a
reflection of the omnipresence of the specie standard rule.
Across all countries, money growth was least variable in the interwar and most variable in the
recent float. However, for the core and G-l1 countries it was least variable under the gold standard.
Under that regime money growth variability was higher in the periphery than the core. Under Bretton
Woods and the recent float the difference between core and periphery money growth variability is less
obvious, again with the principal exception of Latin America which exhibits considerably greater money
38growth variability than all other countries. For these countries the increase in money growth variability
reflects the breakdown of any linkage to a commitment regime.
5.1.3 Government Deficit (Table 5).
Forall 2 1 countries the average ratio of the government deficit to GNP is lowest during the
Bretton Woods period, followed by the gold standard. The highest ratio is for the recent float. In all
regimes, average deficit ratios are higher in peripheral than core countries. (This also holds comparing
the G-1 1 with the rest). Under the gold standard, the highest average ratios were in the Anglo countries
of new settlement and Latin America; under Bretton Woods they occurred in Latin America and under
the float in Latin America and Southern Europe. The standard deviations in fiscal policy followed a
pattern similar to the means --theyare generally lower in core than peripheral countries. Thus,
adherence to convertibility rules may have constrained fiscal policy in the same way as it did monetary
policy. On the other hand, more limited fiscal needs during these regimes may have made it easier to
adhere to the convertibility rule.
One gropp of countries stands Out Ifithecross-country comparison. For the Latin American
countries the fiscal deficit as a share of GNP increases dramatically between the pre-World War II and
post-World War II regimes. In the postwar period it increases between regimes, reaching a peak with
the float. Indeed a closer correlation between the fiscal deficit, money growth and inflation can be
observed across regimes for these countries than is the case for most countries in the G- 11. Such a
correlation may be evidence of lack of credibility in the commitment of the monetary regime.
5.1.4 Summary
In summary, the gold standard regime had the lowest and least variable inflation performance for
all countries. However, within that regime peripheral countries performed worse than the core (and
expanded core). Bretton Woods exhibited a similar pattern with somewhat higher overall inflation. By
contrast the recent float displayed both higher and more variable inflation than both regimes.This
39evidence may reflect a favorable influence of regime adherence on performance, but on the other hand
adherence may have been possible because of greater stability.
Money growth was generally lowest and most stable under the gold standard across all countries.
followed by Bretton Woods. Core countries within each regime followed more prudent and stable
monetary policies than the periphery. By contrast, under the float, money growth was considerably
higher, less stable across all countries. Lower and more stable money growth by core countries under
the gold standard compared to the periphery may reflect better adherence to the commitment mechanism
or alternatively that there was less pressure to gear monetary policy for domestic purposes (Eichengreen,
1992b). The fact that peripheral countries' money growth was still relatively low and stable compared
to later regimes may reflect their intention to adhere to the rule, when conditions were favorable. A
similar but more muted pattern is observed in comparing Bretton Woods to the subsequent float.
Finally, the fiscal deficit, like monetary policy, is lowest and most stable under the gold
standard, followed by Bretton Woods and in sharp contrast to the recent float. Within these regimes
however, weaker performance is observed for peripheral countries. Again like monetary policy, intended
adherence to the regime, ceteris paribus, may have restrained policymakers during these periods
compared to the recent float.
Thus, this statistical evidence reveals substantial differences in economic performance across
regimes as well as differences between countries' and groupings of countries' perfonnanceswithin
regimes. It is not clear however how much the different performance reflects adherence or nonadherence
to rules and vice versa. Analysis of the shocks facing different countries may shed more light onthis
issue.
5.2Demandand Supply Disturbances
An important issue is the extent to which the performance of alternative monetary regimes, as
revealed by the data in the preceding tables, reflects the operation of the monetary regime in constraining
40policy actions or the presence or absence of shocks to the underlying environment. One way to shed light
on this issue, following earlier work by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a) (1992b) (1993) (1994), is to
identify underlying shocks to aggregate supply and demand. According to them, aggregate supply shocks
reflect shocks to the environment and are independent of the regime, but aggregate demand shocks likely
reflect policy actions and are specific to the regime.
The approach used to calculate aggregate supply and demand shocks is an extension of the
bivariate structural vector autoregression (VAR) methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a), we estimated a two-variable VAR in the rate of change
of the price level and output.19 Restrictions on the VAR identify an aggregate demand disturbance,
which is assumed to have only a temporary impact on output and a permanent impact on the price level,
and an aggregate supply disturbance, which is assumed to have a permanent impact on both prices and
output.° Overidenrifying restrictions, namely, that demand shocks are positively correlated and supply
shocks are negatively correlated with prices, can be tested by examining the impulse response functions
to the shocks.
The methodology has important limitations which suggest that the results should be viewed with
caution. The key limitation is that one can easily imagine frameworks in which demand shocks have
permanent effects on output while supply shocks have only temporary effects.2'
We estimated supply (permanent) and demand (temporaiy) shocks, using annual data for each of
the 21 countries, over alternative regimes in the period 1880-1989. The VAR's are based on data for
three separate regime periods (to the extent available): 1880-1913, 1919-1939, and 1946-1989, omitting
the war years because complete data on them were only available for a few of the countries. The VAR's
have two lags. We also did the estimation for aggregated price and output data for the seven country
group ings and for the four broader aggregates of countries.
41Table 6 presents the standard deviations of supply and demand shocks for the 21 countries by
regimes. We also present aggregate shocks for the seven country groupings and for the four broad
aggregates of countries. In addition we show, following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a), the weighted
average of the individual country shocks.
Table 6 shows for the seven country groupings, with the principal exception of Latin America,
that the recent float regime was the most tranquil, with the lowest demand and supply shocks. The
interwar period, again with the exception of Latin America, was the most volatile. Bretton Woods
experienced relatively high demand shocks in most of the country groupings with the exception of Japan.
This likely reflects the widespread use of Keynesian demand management policies in this period. By
contrast supply shocks were quite low across all groupings, not much different from the float. The gold
standard in general exhibited fairly sizeable supply shocks. Indeed, for the core countries, the Anglo
Saxon countries and Japan they were more than twice as high as in the post-World War II period. In
Latin America demand shocks exceeded supply shocks in all regimes except the interwar. In the post-
World War II period, for these countries, demand shocks considerably exceeded supply shocks, especially
under the float. For these countries the constraints of the convertible regime appear to be much weaker
than for the others, although one could argue that the much greater instances of supply shocks in these
countries may in part account for the greater use of discretionary policy.
Across country groupings, the difference between the 'expanded core' of countries and the
periphery observed in Tables 3 to 5isalso apparent. Under the gold standard regime most of these
countries had substantially lower supply and demand shocks than the others. This can be seen in the
comparison between the 0-11 aggregate and the aggregate of all countries except the G- 11.The pattern
also holds up in both post-World War II regimes.
In sum, the evidence on demand and supply shocks complements the preceding evidence in Tables
3 to 5. For the 'expanded core' countries, represented roughly by the 0-11, the gold standard was
42characterized by higher demand and especially higher supply shocks than in the post-World War II
regimes, and within the post war period both the Bretton Woods regime and the float were relatively
stable. This evidence suggests that, for these countries, it is unlikely that the convertible regimes
prevailed because of the absence of supply shocks, since the size of demand and supply shocks was quite
similar across both types of regimes. The durability or fragility of past convertible regimes likely had
more to do with regime design (Bordo, 1993b).
By contrast, for the peripheral countries, especially Latin America and Southern Europe, demand
shocks exceeded supply shocks across all regimes, and especially under the postwar float. The constraints
of the convertible regime appear to be much weaker than for the G-l 1, although one could argue that the
much greater incidence of supply shocks in peripheral countries may in part account for the greater use
of discretionary policy.
6. Conclusion
in conclusion, we suggest answers to three questions. First, what is the evidence for the specie
standard as a contingent rule? Second, why was the nile successful when it was? Third, why did some
countries successfully adhere and others did not?
Our historical survey reveals that the contingent rule over the entire period was strictly followed
by a relatively small number of countries —thecore countries (with the exception of France and Germany
after World War I); the Anglo countries of new settlement, most of the Scandinavian and smaller western
European countries, and Japan. For the rest it was violated. If we focus only on theclassical gold
standard period, the basic convertibility rule was followed by a larger group of countries. For Bretton
Woods, the rule was much less clearly defmed hence it is difficult to distinguish adherence and non
adherence. For that regime clearly, as statistical evidence in Section 5ofsuperior performance measured
by nominal variables compared to other regimes shows, convertibility was important.
43Second, the rule prevailed when it did for a number of possible reasons. The classical gold
standard era was one of stable economic growth, with few impediments to the free allocation of labor,
capital and goods both within and across countries. It was also a period characterized by relative political
stability and, for many of the 'expanded core'countriesby the absence of populist pressure for demand
management (Eichengreen 1992a). In addition, it was an era characterized by the coincidenceof beliefs
in free trade and exchange rate stability by the dominant industrial commercial groups in different
countries (Gallarotti 1993). The dominance of England as a commercial power also was important.
England's clear commitment to the rule and the benefits of access to her financed markets was a key
determinant of other countries adherence.
Third, the different experience of adherence to the rule by the expanded core countries and the
peripheral countries may, wesuggest,be explained by their different stages of economic development.
By the beginning ofthe classical goldstandarderathe 'expanded core' countries were industrialized, had
experienced decades of rising per capita income, had staNe polities and were dominated by groupswho
perceivedthe benefits tothemof monetary stability. In addition, as maturing diversified economies they
werelesssubject to the disruptions of massive swings in the price of primary products. These conditions
were absent in the peripheral countries. Faced with frequent supply shocks for themadherence to the
rule was more difficult.
44References
Abramowitz, Moses. 1973. The Monetary Side of Long Swings in U.S. Economic Growth.Stanford
University Center for Research on Economic Growth. Memorandum No. 146 (mimeo)
Acena, Pablo Martin. 1993. Spain During the Classical Gold Standard Years,1880-1914. In Monetary
Regimes in Transition. (eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Forrest Capie. Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press.
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon. 1983. Rules, Discretion and Reputationin a Model of Monetary
Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12:101-121.
Bayoumi, Tamin and Barry Eichengreen. 1992a. Economic PerformanceUnder Alternative Exchange
Rate Regimes: Some Historical Evidence. University of California at Berkeley.June. (mimeo)
Bayoumi, Tamin and Barry Eichengreen. 1992b. Is There aConflict Between EC Enlargement and
European Monetary Unification? NBER Working Paper No. 3950. January.Greek Economic
Review (forthcoming).
Bayoumi, Tamio and Barry Eichengreen. 1993. Shocking Aspectsof European Monetary Unification.
In Adjustment and Growth in European Monetary Union. (eds.) Francesco Torresand Francesco
Giavazzi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bayourni. Tamin and Barry Eichengreen. 1994. Monetaryand Exchange Rate Arrangements for
NAFTA. Journal of Development Economics 43:125-65.
Bernanke, Benjamin. 1983. Noninonetary Effects of the FinancialCrisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression. American Economic Review. 73:259-76.
Bernanke, Benjamin and Harold James. 1991. The Gold Standard,Deflation and Financial Crisis in the
Great Depression: An International Comparison. In Financial Marketsand Financial Crisis (ed.)
R. Glenn Hubbard, Chicago: University of Chicago Press: :33-68.
45Blanchard, Olivier and Danny Quah. 1989. The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Aggregate
Supply Disturbances. American Economic Review. (September):655-73.
Bloomfield, Arthur. 1959. Monetary Policy Under the international Gold Standard, 18(X)-1914. New
York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Bordo, Michael D. 1981. The Classical Gold Standard: Some Lessons for Today. Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review. 63 (May):2-17.
Bordo, Michael D. 1984. The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach. In A Retrospective on the
Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931. Cods.) Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bordo, Michael D. and Angela Redish. 1990. Credible Commitment and Exchange Rate Stability:
Canada's Interwar Experience. Canadian Journal of Economics. 23(2):357-380.
Bordo, Michael D. and Finn E. Kydland. 1992. The Gold Standard As a Rule. Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland. Working Paper No. 9205. March.
Bordo, Michael D. 1993a. The Brecton Woods International Monetary System: An Historical Overview.
In A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for international Monetary Reform.
(eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bordo, Michael D. 1993b. The Gold Standard, Bretton Woods and Other Monetary Regimes: A
Historical Appraisal. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. 75-2(March/April) :123-191.
Bordo, Michael D. and Lars Jonung. 1994. Monetary Regimes, Inflation and Monetary Reform: An
Essay in Honor of Axel Leijonhufvud. Rutgers University Working Paper No. 94-07.
Bordo, Michael D. and Anna J. Schwartz. 1994. The Specie Standard As a Contingent Rule: Some
Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880 -1990.Rutgers University Working Paper
No. 94-11.
46Bordo, Michael D. and Eugene N. White. 1993. British and French Finance During the Napoleonic
Wars. In Monetary Regimes in Transition. (eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Forrest Capie.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Butlin, S.J. 1986. The Australian Monetary System 1851-1914. Sydney Australian Reserve Bank.
Calomiris, Charles W. 1988.Price and Exchange Rate Determination During the Greenback
Suspension. Oxford Economic Papers. December.
Calomiris, Charles. 1993. Greenback Resumption and Silver Risk: The Economics and Politics of
Monetary Regime Change in the United States, 1862-1900. In Monetary Regimes in Transition.
(eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Forrest Capie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Canzoneri, Matthew. 1985. Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information. American
Economic Review. 75:1056-1070.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Dale W. Henderson. 1991. Monetary Policy in Interdependent
Economies. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Cecchetti, Stephen G. and Georgios Karras. 1992. Sources of Output Fluctuations During the Interwar
Period: Further Evidence on the Causes of the Great Depression. NBER Working Paper No.
4049. April.
Condé, Roberto Cortés. 1989. Dinero, Deuda y Crisis: Evolución Fiscal y Monetaria en Ia Argentina.
Editorial Sudamericana, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella: Buenos Aires.
Cooper, Richard. 1982. The Gold Standard: Historical Facts and Future Prospects. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity. 1:1-45.
Davis, Lance E. and Robert A. Huttenback. 1986. Maininon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political
Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Cecco, Marcello. 1974. Money and Empire: The International Gold Standard, 1890-1914. New
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield.
47DeKock, Gabriel and Vittorio Grilli. 1989. Endogenous Exchange RateRegimeSwitches. NBER
Working Paper No. 3066. August.
DeVries, Margaret G. 1976. The International Monetary Fund1966-1971:The System Under Stress.
Vol. 1: Narrative.Washington,DC: International Monetary Fund.
Edelstein, Michael. 1982. Overseas investment in the Age of High Imperialism: The United Kingdom,
1850-1914. New York: Columbia University Press.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1985. Editor's Introduction. In The Gold Standard in Theory and History. (ed.)
Barry Eichengreen. London: Methuen.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1987. Conducting the International Orchestra: Bank of England Leadership Under
the Classical Gold Standard. Journal of International Money and Finance. (6):5-29.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1989. Hegemonic Stability Theories. In Can Nations Agree? (eds.) Richard
Cooper et. a!. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1992a. The Gold Standard Since Alec Ford. In Britain in the International
Economy: 1870-1939. (eds.) S.N. Broadberry and N.F.R. Crafts. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Eichengreen, Barry. t992b. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression. 1919-1 939.
Oxford University.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1993. Three Perspectives on the Bretton Woods System. In A Retrospective on
the Bretton Woods System. (eds.) Michael. D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press and NBER.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1994. International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century. University of
California at Berkeley. (mimeo)
Eschweiler, Bernhard and Michael D. Bordo. 1993. Rules, Discretion and Central Bank Independence:
The German Experience 1880-1989. NBER Working Paper No. 4547.
48Fishlow, Albert. 1987. Market Forces or Group Interests: Inconvertible Currency in Pre-1914 Latin
America. University of California at Berkeley. (mimeo)
Fishlow, Albert. 1989. Conditionality and Willingness to Pay: Some Parallels from the 1989s. In The
International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective. (eds.) Barry Eichengreen and Peter Lindert.
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Flood, Robert P. and Peter Isard.1989. Simple Rules, Discretion and Monetary Policy. NBER
Working Paper No. 2934.
Ford, A.G. 1962. The GoldStandard1880-1914: Britain and Argentina. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fracianni, NI. and Spinelli, F. 1984. Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914. In A Retrospective
on the Classical Gold Standard, 1921-1931. Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. (eds.)
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1993. The Dynamics of International Monetary Systems: International and
Domestic Factors in the Rise, Reign, and Demise of the Classical Gold Standard. In Coping
with Cowplexivüy in the International System. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis. (eds.) Colorado:
Westview Press.
Friedman, Milton. 1990. Bimetallism Revisited. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 4(4):85-104.
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fritsch, Winston and Gustavo H.B. Franco. 1992. Aspects of the Brazilian Experience Under the Gold
Standard. PUC Rio de Janeiro. (mimeo)
Gallarotti, Giulio, M. 1993. The Scramble for Gold: Monetary Regime Transformation in the 1870s.
In Michael D. Bordo and Forrest Capie (eds.) Monetary Regimes in Transition, Cambridge:
Cambridge Univerity Press.
49Giovannini, Alberto. 1989. How Do Fixed Exchange-Rate Regimes Work: The Evidence From the
Gold Standard, Bretton Woods and the EMS. In Blueprints for ExchangeRate Management.
(eds.) Marvin Miller, Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes. London: Center for Economic
Policy Research. :1346.
Giovannini, Alberto. 1993. Brenon Woods and Its Precursors: Rules Versus Discretion in the History
of International Monetary Regimes. In A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System. (eds.)
Michael D, Bordo and Barry Eichengreen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Grilli, Viuorio. 1990. Managing Exchange Rate Crises: Evidence from the 1890's. Journal of
international Money and Finance. 9:258-275.
Grossman, Herschel J. and John B. Van Huyck. 1988. Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation. American Economic Review. 78:1088-1097.
Haavisto, Tarmo. 1992. Money and Economic Activity in Finland 1866-1985. Lund, Sweden. Lund
Economic Studies.
Hayashi, Fumio. 1989. Japan's Saving Rate: New Data and Reflections. NBER Working Paper No.
3205.
Horsefield, Keith. 1969. The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of international
Monetary Co-operation, Vol. 1, Chronicle. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Jonung, Lars. 1984. Swedish Experience Under the Classical Gold Standard, 1873-1914. In A
Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931. Michael D. Bordo and Anna J.
Schwartz. (eds.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Keating, John W. and John V. Nyc. 1991. Permanent and Transitory Shocks in Real Output: Estimates
from Nineteenth Century and Postwar Economies. St. Louis: Washington University Working
Paper No. 160.
50Keynes, John Maynard. {1930] 1971. The Applied Theory of Money: A Treatise on Money, Vol. 6 of
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.ReprintLondon: MacMillan and New York:
Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society.
Krugman, Paul. 1991. Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
56:669-682.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy. 85:473-491.
Lazaretou. Sophia.1994. Government Spending, Monetary Policies and Exchange Rate Regime
Switches: The Drachma in the Gold Standard Period. Explorations in Economic History,
October. (forthcoming)
Linden. Peter. 1969. Key Currencies and Gold, 1900-1913. Princeton Studies in International Finance,
No. 24. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ltona-Rodriguez. Augustine. 1993. Chile During theGoldStandard: A Successful Paper Money
Experience. Instituto Torcuato Di Tella. (inimeo)
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. and Nancy L. Stokey. 1983. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy
Without Capital. Journal of Monetary Economics. 12:(1)55-93.
Mankiw, Gregory. 1987. The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage—Theory and Evidence. Journal of
Monetary Economics. 20(2)327-41.
McKinnon,Ronald I. 1988. An International Gold Standard Without Gold. Cato Journal. 8(Fall):351-
373.
McKinnon,Ronald 1.1993. International Money in Historical Perspective. Journal of Economic
Literature.31(1):1-44.
51Meltzer, Allan H. and Saranrta Robinson. 1989. Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice. In
Monetary, History and International Finance: Essays in Honor of Anna J. Schwartz. (ed.)
Michael D. Bordo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. :163-195.
Miller, Marcus and Alan Sutherland. 1992. Britain's Return to Gold and Entry into the ERM. In
Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Banks. (eds.) Paul Krugman and Marcus Miller
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, Marcus and Alan Sutherland. 1994. Speculative Anticipations of Sterling's Return to Gold:
Was Keynes Wrong? Economic Journal. July.
Mitchell, Brian R. 1992. International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988. New York: Stockton
Press.
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1992. Destabilizing Effects of Exchange Rate Escape Clauses. NBER Working
Paper No. 3606.
Officer, Lawrence. 1986. The Efficiency of the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1980-1908. Journal of
Political Economy. 94(October): 1038-1073.
Officer, Lawrence. 1993. Gold-Point Arbitrage and Uncovered Interest Arbitrage Under the1925-193 1
Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard. Exploratioizs in Economic History. 30(1):98-127.
Pelaez, Carlos M. and Wilson Suzigan. 1976. Historia Monetaria do Brazil. EditoriaUmversidade de
Brazilia.
Reis, Jaime. 1992. The Gold Standard in Portugal, 1854-1891. Universidale Novade Lisbon. (rnimeo)
Roll, Richard. 1972. Interest Razes and Price Expectations During the CivilWar. Journal of Economic
History. 32(June):476-498.
Schwartz, Anna J. 1984. Introduction. In A Retrospective on the Classical GoldStandard, 1821-1931.
(eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.
Sharkey, R. D. 1959. Money, Class, and Party. Baltimore: Johns HopkinsPress.
52Shearer, Ronald A. and Carolyn Clark. 1984. Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-1935:
Monetary Policy Without a Central Bank. In A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard
1821-1931. (eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Shinjo, Hiroshi. 1962. History of the Yen. Research Institute for Economics and Business
Administration. Japan: Kobe University.
Simons, Henry C. 1951. Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. In A.E.A. Readings in Monetary
Theory. (ed,) Richard D. Irwin. Homewood, Illinois.
Smith, Gregor and Todd Smith. 1993. Wesley Mitchell and Irving Fisher and the Greenback Gold
Reforms 1865-1879. Queens University. (mimeo)
Smith, W. S. and Smith, R.T. 1990. Stochastic Process Switching and the Return to Gold. Economic
Journal. 100(March): 164-175.
Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.
American Economic Review. 71 (6):393-410.
Svennson, Lars E. 0. 1994. Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence In Spite of Fixed
Exchange Rates. Journal of Monew.iy Economics. 33(1): 157-199.
Unger, I. 1964. The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Yeager, Leland B. 1984. The Image of the Gold Standard. In A Retrospective on the Classical Gold
Standard, 1821-1931. (eds.) Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
53</ref_section>*For able research assistance we would like to thank Alexandre Hohmann. For supplying us with
data and valuable information we are indebted to the following: Pablo Martin Acena, Lance Davis, Marc
Flandreau, Lars Jonung, Sophie Lazaretou, Augustin Liona Rodriguez, Gerardo della Paollera, David
Pope, Angela Redish. Jairne Reis, Georg Rich, Fernando Santos. The usual disclaimer holds.
Endnotes
1. The Currency School in England in the early nineteenth century made the case for the Bank of
England's fiduciary note issue to vary automatically with the level of the Bank's gold reserve (the currency
principle). Following such a rule was viewed as preferable (for providing price-level stability) to allowing
the note issue to be altered at the discretion of the well-meaning and possibly well-informed directors of
the Bank (the position taken by the opposing Banking School). For a discussion of the Currency Banking
School debate, see Vinci (1937), Fetter (1965), and Schwartz (1987).
2. Viewed, however, as a rule in the traditional sense —asan automatic mechanism to ensure price
stability —bimetailismmay have had greater scope for automaticity than the gold standard because of the
additional cushion of a switch from one metal to the other. See Friedman (1990).
3. This description is consistent with a result from a model of Lucas and Stokey (1983), in which
financing of wars is a contingency rule that is optimal. In their example, where the occurrence and
duration of the war are uncertain, the optimal plan for the debt is not to service it during the war. Under
this policy, people realize when they purchase the debt it that effectively it will be defaulted on in the event
the war continues.
4. A case study comparing British and French finances during the Napoleonic Wars shows that Britain was
able to finance its wartime expenditures by a combination of taxes, debt, and paper money issue—to smooth
revenue; whereas Fiance had to rely primarily on taxation. France had to rely on a less efficient mix of
finance than Britain because she had used up her credibility by defaulting on outstanding debt at the end
of the American Revolutionary War and by hyperinflating during the Revolution. Napoleon ultimately
returned France to the bimetallic standard in 1803 as part of a policy to restore fiscal probity, but because
of the previous loss of reputation France was unable to take advantage of the contingent aspect of the
bimetallic standard rule. See Bordo and White (1993).
5. The behavior of asset prices (exchange rates and interest rates) during suspension periods suggests that
market agents viewed the commitment to gold as credible. For the U.S. see Roll (1972) and Calomiris
(1988), who present evidence of expected appreciation of the greenback during the American Civil War
based on a negative interest differential between bonds that were paid in greenbacks and those paid in gold.
Also, see Smith and Smith (1993) who demonstrate that movements in the premium on gold from the
Resumption Act of 1875 until resumption was established in 1878 were driven by a credible beliefthat
resumption would occur. For the case of Britain's return to gold in 1925, see Smith and Smith (1990),
Miller and Sutherland (1992) and (1994). An application of the stochastic process switching literature
suggests that the increasing likelihood that resumption would occur at the original parity graduallyaltered
the path of the dollar-pound exchange rate towards the new ceiling, several months in advance.
546. For suggestive evidence see Bordo and Kydland (1992).
7. Also see Officer (1993). His calculations of speculative bands (bands within which uncovered interest
arbitrage prevails consistent with gold point arbitrage efficiency) for the interwar dollar sterling exchange
rate show serious violations only in 1931 •atthe very end of the gold exchange standard.
8. A case study of Canada during the Great Depression provides evidence for the importance of the
credible commitment mechanism of adherence to gold. Canada suspended the gold standard in 1929 but
did not allow the Canadian dollar to depreciate nor the price level to rise for two years. Canada did not
take advantage of the suspension to emerge from the depression because of concern for its credibility with
foreign lenders. See Bordo and Redish (1990).
9. Eschweiler and Bordo (1993) provide evidence for this interpretation for Germany over the period 1883
-1913based on an estimation of the Reichsbank's reaction function. They find that the central bank's
pursuit of an interest rate smoothing policy (an obvious violation of 'the rules of the game') was
subordinate to its commitment to keep the exchange rate within the gold points.
10. The U.S. could change the dollar price of gold if a majority of members (and every member with 10%
or more of the total quotas) agreed.
11. Indeed, Giovannini's (1993) calculations show that during the Bretton Woods convertible period
credibility bounds on interest rates for the major currencies, in contrast to the classical gold standard, were
frequently violated.
12. In 1869 institutions to supply capital to new firms and industries by issuing notes convertible into
government notes were established in 8 commercial cities, of which only the one that issued notes
convertible into silver coin found public acceptance.
13. Despite the monetary disarray, the Meiji government succeeded in floating two foreign loans in
London in 1871 and 1873, the first for I million pounds at 9%, for construction of a railroad between
Tokyo and Yokohama, the second for 3.4 million pounds at 7%, to pay pensions to feudal lords and
soldiers, the feudal clans having been abolished in 1870 by the new national government. During the same
years, England, France, and Russia sold their bonds in Japan, paid for by gold exports from Japan.
14. Although Chile's experience of borrowing funds in sterling at prevailing rates in a period when the
currency was inconvertible does not seem to support this statement (see Llona-Rodriguez, 1993, n. 9).
15. Use of capital calls on the new securities issued is superior to the new foreign lending series used in
earlier studies (e.g. Edelstein, 1982). This is because the capital calls give the amount of funds actually
available to send to the receiving countries, whereas the new foreign lending series represents the face value
of the bonds. The amounts actually available were only a fraction of the total issue which the investors
conunitted themselves to provide over a period of years during which calls were made (see Davis and
Huttenback, 1986, ch.1).
16. A real series deflated by the British Sauerbeck-Statist wholesale price index is very similar to the
current dollar series presented here.
17. For earlier applications of similar regime comparisons in a different context see Bordo (1993a),
(1993b) and Bordo and Jonung (1994).
5518. In Bordo and Schwartz (1994) we alsopresentdata forrealpercapita growth,and the absolute rates
of change of nominal and real exchange rates.
19. Both variables were rendered stationary by first differencing.
20. Specifically, four restrictions are placed on the matrix of the shocks: two are simple normalizations,
which define the variances of the shocks to aggregate demand and aggregate supply; the third assumes that
demand and supply shocks are orthogonal; the fourth is that demand shocks have only temporary effects
on output, i.e., that the cumulative effect of demand shocks on the rate of change in output must be zero.
21. See Keating and Nye (1991).
22. The results for most country groupings in the interwar period figures are similar to those reported for
the U.S. by Cecchetti and Karras (1992), who estimate a three-variable VAR with monthly data. The late
1920's and early 1930's reveal a major negative demand shock consistent with Friedman and Schwartz's
(1963) attribution of the onset of the Great Depression to monetary forces. After 1931, negative supply
shocks predominate, consistent with Bernanke's (1983) and Bernanke and James' (1991) explanation for
the severity of the Great Depression that stresses the collapse of the financial system.
23. The rankings by regime for the weighted average of individual country shocks are similar to the group
aggregates.
24. These results are very similar to those presented for the G-7 in Bordo (1993b) and by Eichengreen
and Bayoumi (1992a).
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Sources: Bernank. and James(1991); Bordo and Xydland(1992); But1iiit19B6;
Cortes—Conde(1989); Eichanqreen(1992b); Fratianni and Spinelli(1984);
Fritsch and Franco(1992); Baaviito(1992); Jonung(1984);
Lazaretou(1994); Llona—Rodriguaz(1993); Martin Acena(1993);
Pelaez and Stizigan(1976) Reis(1991); Shearer and Clark(1984);
Shinjo( 1962)
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'Mean growthratecalculated a.thetim.cc.fficientfrom a regression ofhe
naturallogarithm of the variable on a constant and at.m.trend.
Data sourc.st SeeAppendixto Bordo andSchwartz (1994).
table 3tDescriptive Statistics of Selected Opem Econoey
loflatiom. Annual DataMeans andStandardDeviations'
Varjab1., 21Coutri.s 1861—19Q:
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11.2 8.4 32.622.9Table 4:DescriptiVe Statistics of Selected op. Variabi.., 21 Coumtriea 1&&l.1550:
Money Growth.AnnualDat*2lean,andStandard Deviations'
Bretton F.oatinq
Gold Standard Interwar Wood. Exchange
(1881—1913) (1919—1938) (1946—1970) (1974—1990)
a) Core Countries
United Status 6.1 4.1 0.6 8.6 6.3 5.8 8.6 2.4
UnitSd Kingdom 2.11.7 0.84.7 3.2 3.2.s
Germany 5.74.7 1.310.1 12.85.9 5.7
francs 2.14.7 6.48.5 11.57.5 8.83.4
mean 4.03.8 2.38.0 8.55.6 9.24.0
b) Anglo—Saxon Countrie,of
New Settlement
Australia 3.5 5.8 1.3 6.5 5.6 6.7 9.7 4.0
Canada 7.4 5.3 1.14.7 6.0 4.0 10.6 3.9
mean 5.4 5.5 1.2 5.6 6.8 5.3 10.24.0
C)LatinAmerica
Argentina 6.712.1 1.88.9 22.2 10.1 124.6 82.6
Brazil 6.925.8 9.212.4 32.621.5 91.579.8
chile 3.7 9.7 5.115.1 29.7 12.8 32.239.3
mean 3.315.9 5.412.1 28.2 14.8 82.867.2
d)Southern Europe
Greece 4.414.4 na na 12.1 4.6 17.02.3
Italy 3.23.1 3.6 6.2 13.3 7.8 13.4 4.9
Portugal 0.72.8 14.213.1 5.8 5.9 14.6 6.7
Spain 1.66.5 2.04.4 11.9 4.7 13.44.8
mean 2.56.7 6.67.9 10.8 5.7 14.64.7
s) Scandinavia
Denmark 4.74.2 —0.44.8 6.1 4.1 11.8 5.5
Finland 6.86.0 6.37.0 11.8 5.2 13.34.0
Norway 4.92.9 —1.65.6 5.8 3.6 12.1 3.4
Sweden 5.93.7 —0.84.9 7.1 3.5 8.64.8
mean 5.64.2 0.9 5.6 7.7 4.1 11.44.4
f) Other Western Europe
Belgium na na 6.39.8 4.5 3.2 4.43.7
N.t1erlande 4.23.5 —1.08.1 5.5 4.9 6.64.6
Switzerland na na 8.1 7.9 5.8 4.2 3.47.0
mean 4.23.5 4.58.6 5.3 4.1 4.85.1
g) Japan 7.214.5 0.59.7 16.2 16.2 5.8 6.3
h) All countries 4.27.1 3.28.1 11.2 6.9 20.513.5
i)All except 4
core countries 4.3 8.0 3.5 8.1 11.9 7.2 23.115.7
j)GlO + Switzerland 4.95.0 2.4 7.6 8.4 6.0 8.1 4.6
k) Allexcept010+
Switzerland 3.57.9 4.2 8.6 14.3 7.9 34.023.2
'Notesand Sources: See Table 3
63Table St Descriptive Statistic, of 8.1.ct.d Open EC00057Viriabl.., 21Coutri.. laa-j9go:
Oover.ent Deficitasa 9ofONP.Annual Data:Meansand Standard Deviation.
Br.tton Floating
Gold Standard Int.rwar Wood. Lachang.
(1881—1913) (1919—1938) (1946—1970) (1974—1990)
a) Core CountrieS
Unit.d States —0.3 0.6 1.9 4.4 0.1 2.1 3.0 1.5
United Xinqdom 0.1 0.8 —0.7 1.7 —2.3 2.8 2.2 1.6
Germany 2.81.0 1.41.1 0.11.8 1.50.6
France 0.61.1 3.83.8 2.22.3 1.51.3
mean 0.8 0.9 1.6 2.8 0.0 2.3 2.1 1.3
b) Anglo-SaxonCountries of
New Settlement
Australia 15.12.1 12.62.2 5.0 2.4 1.40.3
Canada 0.5 1.1 1.5 2.5 —1.1 1.7 2.92.0
mean 7.8 1.6 7.1 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.2
C)LatinAmerica
Argentina 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.8 6.0 3.7 9.3 6.8
Brazil 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 5.5 5.8
Chile 2.44.4 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.1 2.9
mean 2.33.1 1.81.7 3.1 2.2 5.3 5.2
d)Bouth.rn Europe
Gremce na na 2.55.9 2.1 1.9 6.0 1.2
Italy 0.9 1.1 8.6 9.7 3.2 4.0 9.52.2
Portugal 1.2 0.7 2.5 3.6 1.8 1.2 12.7 3.0
Spain —0.20.4 1.01.8 0.9 0.8 1.21.1
mean 0.60.7 3.7 5.3 2.0 2.0 7.4 2.1
.) Scandinavia
D.meark 0.51.2 0.10.8 —1.6 1.3 13.36.8
Finland 0.10.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5
Norway 0.60.7 1.71.5 0.6 2.1 9.4 4.6
Sweden 0.00.6 1.61.2 —0.2 2.6 1.1 3.8
mean 0.30.7 0.90.9 —0.2 1.6 6.14.0
f) Other Western Europe
BSlqiun na na 3.91.2 4.8 4.8 7.32.7
Netherlands 2.1 0.3 5.63.2 0.6 2.6 3.8 2.4
Switzerland na na 0.0 0.5 —0.2 1.1 0.1 0.7
2.1 0.3 3.2 1.6 1.7 2.8 3.7 1.9
9)Japan —3.1 3.3 —5.1 3.3 —0.1 3.2 4.5 1.9
h) All countries 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.6 1.2 2.2 4.7 2.6
i)All except4
cor. countries 1.8 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 5.3 2.9
)010 +Switzerland 0.4 1.1 2.0 3.0 0.6 2.6 3.4 1.9
k) All except 010+
Switzerland 2.7 1.6 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.7 6.1 3.4
Note, and Sources: See Table3
64Table 6& Supply (PeXfleflt) and e.and (Temporary) Shocksi 21 Countrj.i i8a-so.
Annual Data Standard Deviations ofShock.)
Bretton FLoatin
Gold Standard Interwar Wood. Exchange
(1881—1913) (1919—1938) (1946—1970) (1974—1950)
0 S D S 0 S 0 S
1. Cor• Countries
3.81 4.46 6.74 2.33 1.54
2.16 1.93 3.52 2.62 1.95
2.32 4.47 3.13 2.88 2.65
3.75 7.17 5.19 3.501.75
2.92 4.07 4.46 2.38 1.79
3.12 4.75 4.57 2.32 1.57
United Kingdom 8%; G.rmany10%; Franc.13%.
2.Anglo—Saxon Countries of New S.ttlem.rtt
3.37 4.02 3.73 2.48




































































































































































Greece 6%; Italy 67%; Portugal 4%; Spain 23%.
5. Scandinavia
2.69 2.89 4.941.88 1.61
2.31 2.26 3.532.91 7.89
2.54 1.43 7.503.94 4.33
2.57 3.03 3.085.10 3.89
2.75 2.25 4.623.57 4.64
2.52 2.50 4.363.74 4.27
Denmark 22%; Finland 15%; Norway 17%: Sweden 46%.
65Table 6: Supply (P.rmaneflt) and Deead (Ts.porary) Shocks: 21 Coumtrj.s l88l1990. (continued;
Bretton Floating
Gold Standard Interwar wood. Exchange
(1881—1913) (1919—1938) (1946—1970) (19741990)
D S 0 S 0 S D S
6. Other W.st.rn Europe
Belgium na na 5.823.37 2.14 1.67 1.55 1.99
Netherlands 0.810.81 2.793.42 2.97 2.67 1.94 1.85
Switzerland na ma 3.542.08 2.50 1.72 2.24 1.44
Group Aggregate (a) 0.810.81 4.263.02 2.65 2.20 1.99 1.87
Group Aggregate (b) 0.810.81 4.153.11 2.72 2.37 1.81 1.79
Weights: Belgium 32%; Netherlands 41%; Switzerland 27%.
Gi0+Switz.rland (a) 2.712.97 4.364.16 2.48 2.30 2.232.24
010+Switz.rland (b) 2.463.42 4.57 5.37 2.49 2.05 2.112.26
Weights: Belgium 1%;Canada 4%;Francs 7%;Germany 9%;Italy 5%;Japan 11%;
Netherlands 2%; Sweden 2%; Switzerland 1%: Vnit.d Kingdom 6%; United States
52%.
All except Gil (a) 5.274.17 5.104.23 7.84 3.92 15.28 3.07
All except Gil (b) 6.734.04 4.654.60 8.85 3.25 17.69 4.71
Weights: Argentina 12%; Australia 18%; Brazil 21%; Chile 4%; Denmark 8%; Finland 5%;
GreeCe 5%; Norway 6%; Portugal 3%; Spain 18%.
7. Japan
4.853.39 6.285.36 3.18 2.56 2.392.50
8. Aggregates
Alt countries (a) 4.233.51 4.92 4.61 5.12 2.80 8.872.81
All countries (b) 2.973.46 4.90S.63 3.34 2.13 3.442.32
Weights: Argentina 1%; Australia 2%; Belgium 1%; Brazil 2%;Canada 4%; Chile 0%;
Denmark 1%; Finland 0%; Franc. 7%; Germany 8%; Greece 0%; Italy 5%; Japan
9%; Netherlands 2%;Norway 1%;Portugal 0%; Spain 2%; Sweden 2%;
Switzerland 1%; United Kingdom 6%; United Stat.. 46%.
All except core (a) 4.413.49 5.204.68 5.77 2.74 10.413.24
All except core (b) 3.673.11 5.425.08 4.52 2.67 6.472.80
Weights: Argentina 3%; Australia 5%; Belgium 4%; Brazil 5%; Canada 12%; Chile 1%;
Denmark 2%; Finland 2%; Greece 1%; Italy 15%; Japan 29%; Netherlands 5%;
Norway 2%; Portugal 1%; Spain 5%; Sweden 5%; Switzerland 3%.
(a) Aggregate data.
(b)Weighted average of individual country shocks. the weights are calculated a. the share o
each countrys National Income in the Total Income in th. group of countries in 1970, where
the GNP data are converted to dollars using th. actual exchange rate.

















































































































































































































































































































For the dO countries plus Switzerland, see Data Appendix in Eordo and Jonung (1994
except for th. following countries
Australia
(1) Money. 1880—1990, Provided by David Pope. Australian National Ur.iversitv.
(2) Real GD?. 1880—1990, David Pope. (3) GD? Deflator. 1880—1990, DavidPoQe.
(4) Exchange Rate.1880—1990, David Pope.(5) Government Expend.tres and
Revenues. 1880—1988, David Pop..
Denna r Ic
(1) Money. 1880—1990, Provided by Lara Jonung.(2) Real GDP. 1880-1990, Lars
Jonung. (3) GD? Deflator. 1880—1988, B.R. Mitchell (1992). (4) Exchange Rate.
1880—1990, Lar. .Jonung.(5) Government Expenditures and Revenues. 18-1958.
S.R. Mitchell (1992).
Finland
(1) Money. 1880—1990, Lan Jonung. (2) Real GOP. 1880—1990, Lara Jorun. (3)
GD? Deflator. 1880—1988, B.R. Mitchell (1992).(4) Exchange Rate. 1880-1990,
Lan Jonung. (5) Government Expenditures and Revenues. 1880-1988, B.R. Mtche.
(1992).
Greece
(1)Money. 1880—1914, Sophia Lazaretou; 1962—1990, International FnancLa1
Statistics (1992).(2 Real GD?. 1927—1988, 8.R. Mitchell (1992).(3) GOP
Deflator.1927—1988, B.R. Mitchell (1992). (4) Exchange Rate.1390—1914,
Sophia Lazaretou;1962—1990, International Financial Statistics (1992). (E)
Government Expenditures and Revenues.1880—1936,Sophia Lazaretou; i93-1939,
8.R. Mitchell (1992); 1956—1986, 3.R. Mitchell (1992).
Norway
(1) Money. 1880—1990, Lan Jonung. (2) Real GDP. 1880—1990, Lars Jonung.(3)
GD? Deflator: 1880—1988, 8.R. Mitchell (1992).(4) Exchange Rate. 1880-1990,
Lars Jonung. (5) Government Expenditures and Revenues. 1880-1988, B.R. M.tche11
(1992)
Portugal
(1) Money. 1880-1990, Provided by Fernando Santos, !Jniversidade do Pcrto. (2)
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